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INTRODUCTION
In the more than thirty years since Ronald Coase's The Problem
of Social Cost,1 John Brown, Guido Calabresi, Robert Cooter, Peter
Diamond, Richard Epstein, William Landes, Mitchell Polinsky,
Richard Posner, George Priest, Gary Schwartz, Steven Shavell, and
others too numerous to mention have developed an extensive
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'Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3J.L. & ECON. 1, 1-2 (1960)
(challenging Pigovian analysis which focuses on the divergence between the net
private and social products of a given activity).
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economic theory of accident law based on Coase's work.2 Neverthe-
less, we still lack an economic theory of accidents. Indeed, the
current economic theory of accident law seems oddly disjointed
2 Important works on the economics of tort include GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS
OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 14-16 (1970) (developing a theory
of accident law); John P. Brown, Toward an Economic Theory of Liability, 2 J. LEGAL
STUD. 323, 347 (1973) (developing now orthodox game-theoretic model of accident
law); Guido Calabresi &Jon T. Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81
YALE L.J. 1055, 1084 (1972) (developing a test for strict liability and arguing that this
test is more likely than classical negligence calculus to induce minimum social cost);
Peter A. Diamond, Single Activity Accidents, 3J. LEGAL STUD. 107, 107 (1974)
(developing models to examine how tort law affects resource allocation); Richard A.
Epstein, Defenses and Subsequent Pleas in a System of Strict Liability, 3 J. LEGAL STUD.
165, 166 (1974) (examining limits of economic analysis of systems of negligence and
strict liability); Richard A. Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2J. LEGAL STUD. 151,
152 (1973) (proposing causal theory of liability); Richard A. Posner, Strict Liability:
A Comment, 2J. LEGAL STUD. 205,205 (1973) (arguing that corrective justice theorists
misunderstand the economic consequences of strict liability). Gary Schwartz extended
economic analysis to rules of contributory and comparative negligence. See Gary T.
Schwartz, Contributory and Comparative Negligence: A Reappraisal, 87 YALE L.J. 697,
703-12 (1978).
Although Brown's article was the earliest in the mathematical tradition that now
constitutes the orthodox economic theory of tort, Richard Posner offered the first
positive economic theory of negligence. See Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence,
1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29, 29 (1972) (proposing a theory explaining the social function of
negligence and the system of accident liability). Subsequently he and William Landes
published a series of articles that refined and extended Brown's equations. See
William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Causation in Tort Law: An Economic
Approach, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 109 (1983) (proposing theory of proximate cause and
cause in fact); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theory of
Intentional Torts, 1 INT'L L. & ECON. REV. 127 (1981) (developing theory of law of
intentional harms); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Positive Economic
Theory of Tort Law, 15 GA. L. REV. 851 (1981) [hereinafter Landes & Posner, Positive
Economic Theory] (developing general theory of accident law); William M. Landes &
Richard A. Posner, Joint and Multiple Tortfeasors: An Economic Analysis, 9 J. LEGAL
STUD. 517 (1980) [hereinafter Landes & Posner, Joint and Multiple Tortfeasors]
(developing economic theory ofjoint and several tort liability); William M. Landes &
Richard Posner, Salvors, Finders, Good Samaritans, and Other Rescuers: An Economic
Analysis of Law and Altruism, 7J. LEGAL STUD. 83 (1978) (providing unified theory of
legal doctrine regulating salvage and rescue). Landes and Posner also extended
economic analysis to many liability rules and situations that Brown never considered.
See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT
LAW (1987) (comparing property rights with liability rules, and strict liability with
negligence; developing economic model of accident law, intentional torts,joint and
multiple tortfeasors, catastrophic personal injury and products liability).
Steven Shavell has also taken a leading role in developing the orthodox theory
of liability rules, see generally STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW
(1987) (providing a comprehensive analysis of accident law from an economic
perspective), as has George L. Priest. See George L. Priest, A Theory of the Consumer
Product Warranty, 90 YALE L.J. 1297, 1307-19 (1981) (introducing insurance consider-
ations).
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from the underlying behavior that accident law is supposed to
regulate. Economically, why do accidents take place? What makes
negligent accidents common and what makes them uncommon? In
short, what is the economic theory of accidents and how does it
connect with the economic theory of accident law?
This Article seeks to extract a theory of accidents from the
"grown order" of accident law.' Indeed, the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur is an ideal place to seek this theory, because it assesses
liability in the absence of clear evidence of what went wrong. In
building the res ipsa doctrine, the courts have tried to predict
situations in which negligent accidents are especially likely. Since
the current economic theory of tort has practically no predictive
power about when negligent accidents are likely, res ipsa seems a
natural place to look for theoretical improvements.
The modern economic theory of accident law is principally a
mathematical description of the conditions that will yield zero
negligent behavior.4 A large literature has now concluded that if
SFriedrich Hayek coined the terms "grown order" and "spontaneous order" to
describe "a self-generating or endogenous order." Biological systems, language,
markets, and the common law were the examples he gave. In Hayek's frame, the
opposing idea was a "made order," which is "an exogenous order or an arrangement
[which] may... be described as a construction, [or as] an artificial order." 1 F.A.
HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LBERTY 37 (1973). Examples of made orders are an
order of battle (the deployment of troops or fighting ships), a building, and statute
law. To Hayek, these different kinds of human institutions-grown orders and made
orders-implied different explanatory principles. If one wants to understand a made
order, it truly does make sense to inquire into the design of the maker. Hayek
argued that, on the other hand, the sensible thing for grown orders is to devise a
positive theory that explains the observations. For instance, the theory of evolution
explains much about biological systemsjust as modem price theory explains markets:
neither theory posits a human design. See id. at 38-39. Another legal work in this
same tradition is BRUNO LEONI, FREEDOM AND THE LAw 23 (1991) (drawing analogies
between the market economy and the common law and between planned economies
and legislation). See Peter H. Aranson, Bruno Leoni in Retrospect, 11 HARV.J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 661, 665 (1988) (reviewing Leoni's insights and contributions; updating
conclusions by tracing developments since 1961); Leonard P. Liggio & Tom G.
Palmer, Freedom and the Law: A Comment on Professor Aranson's Article, 11 HARv.J.L.
& PUB. POL'Y 713, 713 (1988) (describing the interrelationships between Leoni and
the law and economics movement, as well as Leoni's impact on the movement); Tom
G. Palmer, Intellectual Property: A Non-Posnerian Law and Economics Approach,
12 HAMuNE L. REV. 261, 263 (1989) (presenting an alternative law and economics
approach to intellectual property influenced by Hayek and Leoni).
4John Brown modeled the standard of care required under the negligence rule.
His model, which has had tremendous influence, suggests that the negligence rule will
induce both injurers and victims to use due care. See Brown, supra note 2, at 328-30.
Indeed, under his model, they would both use due care even if there were no
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the rule is negligence, if courts and private parties make no errors
about the legal standard, if precaution is not random, and if private
parties have uniform precaution costs (that is, no one is specially
challenged), there will be no negligent behavior.5  Modern
doctrine of contributory negligence-a very striking conclusion that most economists
now accept. Landes and Posner published a similar model which demonstrates that
multiple tortfeasors will also use due care if the rule is negligence. See Landes &
Posner,Joint and Multiple Tortfeasos, supra note 2, at 517. Important recent studies
of the multiple tortfeasor problem include Jennifer H. Arlen, ReconsideringEfficient
Tort Rules for Personal Injury: The Case of Single Activity Accidents, 32 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 41, 46 (1990) [hereinafter Arlen, ReconsideringEfficient Tort Rules] (criticizing the
emphasis on unilateral risk of orthodox economic model of accidents and developing
a model which includes bilateral risk activities); Jennifer H. Arlen, Re-Examining
Liability Rules When Injurers as Well as Victims Suffer Losses, 10 INT'L REV. L. & ECON.
233, 234 (1990) [hereinafter Arlen, Re-Examining Liability Rules] (reexamining the
issue of efficient liability rules for injuries from bilateral-risk activities when neither
party is a priori immune from liability); Lewis A. Kornhauser & Richard L. Revesz,
Sharing Damages Among Multiple Tortfeasors, 98 YALE L.J. 831, 833-35 (1989)
(examining the efficiency ofjoint and several liability, contribution, and noncontribu-
tion rules in the contexts of negligence and strict liability); Avon K. Leong, Liability
Rules When Injurers as Well as Victims Suffer Losses, 9 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 105, 110
(1989) (arguing that when injurers also suffer losses, it is more difficult to design
liability rules with socially optimal effects). But see Mark F. Grady, Common Law
Control of Strategic Behavior: Railroad Sparks and the Farmer, 17J. LEGAL STuD. 15, 32-
35 (1988) (reasoning that doctrine of avoidance form of contributory negligence is
necessary to induce corrective precaution by victims).
' The most sophisticated economic models strive to explain why we can still
observe some negligence determinations in a world which has rationally responded
to the Learned Hand formula. Landes and Posner give several reasons for expecting
a positive number of negligence cases in spite of a rule that is designed to make
negligent behavior unprofitable. Their reasons are: (1) a mistake about the legal
standard by a court or a party; (2) care has a stochastic, that is, a random component;
(3) the averaging inherent in the reasonable person standard; and (4) depreciating
precedent. See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 2, at 72-73. Shavell theorizes that the
chief reasons for observing negligent behavior in the real world are uncertainty, error,
and misperception. He also notes that uncertainty can lead actors to overestimate the
required standard of care and to use more than due care in response. See SHAVELL,
supra note 2, at 79-85. Another reason for negligence that is now emerging in the
models is the presence of positive litigation costs. When victims face positive
litigation costs, injurers will sometimes find it advantageous to be negligent. See Keith
N. Hylton, Costly Litigation and Legal Error Under Negligence, 6J.L. ECON. & ORG. 433,
450-51 (1990) (arguing that "underdeterrence must result ... unless the Hand
formula is modified to incorporate litigation costs" and that "[l]egal error can...
counterbalance the tendency of a negligence regime in which litigation is costly to
result in undercompliance and underdeterrence"); Keith N. Hylton, The Influence of
Litigation Costs on Deterrence Under Strict Liability and Under Negligence, 10 INT'L REV.
L. & ECON. 161, 161 (1990) (asserting that strict liability and negligence rules lead to
underdeterrence when litigation costs are taken into account); Janusz A. Ordover,
Costly Litigation in the Model of Single Activity Accidents, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 243, 257
(1978) (arguing that when litigation costs exceed the expected value of damages, tort
liability may have no incentive effect on care taken); Janusz A. Ordover, On the
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economic tort theory is thus analogous to the traditional economic
theory of industrial organization, which posited that prices will be
competitive if information is perfect, if buyers and sellers are
numerous, if inputs and outputs are divisible, and so forth. For
many modern tort theorists, finding an actual instance of negligent
behavior is analogous to finding a monopoly price. It suggests an
"imperfection."
Res ipsa is a legal rule that lets plaintiffs avoid proving specific
negligence when they can show that the type of accident speaks of
the defendant's negligence. The courts' surprising premise is that
some accidents are usually caused by negligence. When the plaintiff
brings his case within the doctrine, the judge tells the jury that it
may infer negligence from the accident's very occurrence. This is
why the doctrine embodies a theory of accidents. Although res ipsa
forms an important part of negligence law, up to this point
economic theorists of tort law have scarcely mentioned it in their
writings.6 The reason for the omission is implicit in their theory.
If one's overriding concern is to define the sufficient conditions for
zero negligent behavior, one is unlikely to have much interest in a
legal doctrine that says that negligent behavior is sometimes probable.
7
Consequences of Costly Litigation in the Model of Single Activity Accidents: Some New
Results, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. 269, 270 (1981) (comparing levels of utility when
settlements are permitted and when they are not allowed).
6 Landes and Posner's treatment of res ipsa, which is contained in one footnote,
argues that the doctrine allows the trier of fact to infer negligence from circumstan-
tial evidence. See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 2, at 123 n.2. In his book on
accident law, Shavell does not mention the doctrine. See SHAVELL, supra note 2.
7 Also, economists have inadvertently made it too easy for their models to settle
on nonnegligent equilibria. Because the now orthodox models leave out the cause
in fact limitation, a person going 26 miles per hour in the school zone is liable for
children who dart out so close that even a 10 mile per hour speed would not save
them. This inadvertent theoretical omission creates a discontinuity which induces
uncertain actors to use too much precaution. Hence, most economic theorists think
that actors are likely to use too much precaution, not too little. See e.g., John E.
Calfee & Richard Craswell, Some Effects of Uncertainty on Compliance with Legal
Standards, 70 VA. L. REv. 965, 974-84 (1984) (analyzing ways in which uncertainty
about the legal standard can give parties incentives to over- or undercomply with legal
rules); Robert D. Cooter, Economic Analysis of Punitive Damages, 56 S. CAL. L. REv. 79
(1982) (using orthodox economic model to show that plaintiffs should get punitive
damages only where there is intentional fault); Robert D. Cooter, Prices and Sanctions,
84 COLUM. L. REv. 1523, 1526-30 (1984) (arguing that the negligence rule under
orthodox model contains a discontinuity); Robert D. Cooter, Unity in Tor4 Contrac,
and Property: The Model of Precaution, 73 CAL. L. REv. 1, 2945 (1985) (analyzing the
relationship that would exist between tort and contract law if courts could not apply
the cause in fact doctrine); Richard Craswell & John E. Calfee, Deterrence and
Uncertain Legal Standards, 2 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 279, 280 (1986) (stating that
1994)
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When we take the economic assumptions that yield non-
negligent equilibria and try to use them to explain res ipsa cases, we
get confusion. When a commercial airliner crashes, the courts apply
res ipsa loquitur' Even when no one knows anything about how
the plane crash occurred-maybe the aircraft disappeared without a
trace-courts infer that someone's negligence probably caused the
accident.' There is nothing in the current economic theory of tort
uncertainty concerning legal standards is likely to lead to overcompliance). The
omission of cause in fact from the modern understanding of negligence has led to
false problems. Shavell writes, "If injurers took less than due care they would be
exposed to the risk of liability, so that their expected costs would equal total accident
costs." SHAVELL, supra note 2, at 8. Shavell would be right if there were no doctrine
of cause in fact. I have argued that the discontinuity goes away when courts are able
to limit negligence liability with the cause in fact requirement. See Mark F. Grady,
Discontinuities and Information Burdens: A Review of the Economic Structure of Tort Law,
56 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 658, 667-74 (1988) (reviewing LANDES & POSNER, supra note
2)); Mark F. Grady, Proximate Cause and the Law of Negligence, 69 IOWA L. REV. 363,
391-413 (1984) (arguing that when courts examine untaken precautions and use the
cause in fact doctrine, injurers will neither undercomply nor overcomply); Mark F.
Grady, A New Positive Economic Theory of Negligence, 92 YALE L.J. 799, 818 (1983)
(arguing that the cause in fact doctrine eliminates discontinuity in the negligence
rule). Using a model of the negligence rule without cause in fact, Haddock and
Curran have argued that comparative negligence will reduce or eliminate the
discontinuity that might otherwise induce parties to use too much precaution. See
David Haddock & Christopher Curran, An Economic Theory of Comparative Negligence,
14J. LEGAL STUD. 49, 59-67 (1985); see also Robert D. Cooter & Thomas Ulen, An
Economic Casefor Comparative Negligence, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1067,1070 (1986) (arguing
that comparative negligence relieves the problem of discontinuity); MichelleJ. White,
An Empirical Test of the Comparative and Contributory Negligence Rules in Accident Law,
20 RAND J. ECON. 308, 325-29 (1989) (asserting that incentives to exercise care to
avoid accidents are greater under a contributory negligence regime than under a
comparative negligence system and that incentives provided by comparative
negligence to avoid accidents are weaker than is economically efficient). Butsee Mark
F. Grady, Multiple Tortfeasors and the Economy of Prevention, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 653,
671-72 (1990) [hereinafter Grady, Multiple Tortfeasors] (arguing that comparative
negligence will induce more precaution than contributory negligence when parties are
tempted to behave strategically).
' See Cox v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 379 F.2d 893, 895 (7th Cir. 1967) (finding
that res ipsa was available to a survivor when the deceased's commercial flight crashed
without explanation), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1044 (1968); Becker v. American Airlines,
Inc., 200 F. Supp. 839, 840 (S.D.N.Y. 1961) (holding that despite an earlier tendency
to deny application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur against airlines, the doctrine
is now firmly accepted in New York). For a general discussion tracing the
development of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine in connection with aviation cases, see
1 STUART M. SPEISER & CHARLES F. KRAUSE, AvATiON TORT LAW §§ 1:9 to :15 (1978)
and Theresa L. Kruk, Annotation, Res Ipsa Loquitur in Aviation Accidents, 25
A.L.R.4TH 1237 (1983).
' See, e.g., Haasman v. Pacific Alaska Air Express, 100 F. Supp. 1, 2 (D. Alaska
1951) (holding that res ipsa loquitur applies when a commercial airliner disappears
without a trace), aff'dper curiam sub nom. Des Marais v. Beckman, 198 F.2d 550 (9th
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to justify this inference while there is much to oppose it. Interest-
ingly, courts have not applied the res ipsa doctrine as readily to
small plane crashes, 0 and the res ipsa puzzle is only compounded
if we try to use the standard economic explanations for negligent
behavior as a positive tool to distinguish the private plane cases
from the commercial ones.
1'
The current economic theory of tort could suggest either that
courts are mistaken about res ipsa cases or that the whole doctrine
is just a fictional form of strict liability. Based on my informal
surveys, 12 most economic theorists of tort opt for the "strict
liability in disguise" theory, and usually stress that many res ipsa
cases, including airplane crashes, are "unilateral care" accidents:
only the airline can use precaution;"3 the victims cannot. Since the
1960s economists have argued that strict liability is appropriate for
unilateral care accidents. Coase and Calabresi, both of whom
assumed that the unilateral case was normal, said that strict liability
should be imposed on the cheaper cost avoider."4
The "strict liability in disguise" theory does not really explain
the res ipsa doctrine. For instance, how would it explain why small
plane crash cases come out differently than commercial aircraft
Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 922 (1953).
o See, e.g., Kelley v. Central Nat'l Bank, 345 F. Supp. 737, 741 (E.D. Va. 1972)
(stating that res ipsa did not apply to the unexplained crash of a small, private
airplane); Crawford v. Rogers, 406 P.2d 189, 193 (Alaska 1965) (same); Herndon v.
Gregory, 81 S.W.2d 849, 852 (Ark. 1935) (same); Rennekamp v. Blair, 101 A.2d 669,
672 (Pa. 1954) (same), overruled on other grounds by Griffith v. United Airlines, Inc.,
203 A.2d 796 (Pa. 1964); Budgett v. Soo Sky Ways, Inc., 266 N.W. 253, 254 (S.D.
1936) (same); English v. Miller, 43 S.W.2d 642, 644 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931) (same).
1 Compare Towle v. Phillips, 172 S.W.2d 806, 808 (Tenn. 1943) (finding the
doctrine inapplicable to a small, private plane crash) with Capital Airlines, Inc. v.
Barger, 341 S.W.2d 579, 585 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1960) (holding the doctrine applicable
to a small, commercial crash and distinguishing contrary private plane cases).
12 To my knowledge there is no prior written economic theory of res ipsa loquitur.
Nevertheless, when I presented earlier drafts at workshops, several legal economists
told me that they had always thought that res ipsa loquitur was just a fictional form
of strict liability.
"Maybe the air traffic controllers could use precaution also.
14 See CALABRaSI, supra note 2, at 136-39 (coining the term "cheapest cost avoider"
and spelling out the economic argument for placing liability on that person); Coase,
supra note 1, at 33-34 (giving example that shows liability should be placed on the
cheaper cost avoider when transaction costs are high). A synonym for the unilateral
care case is the alternative care case. The earlier literature assumed that either one
party or the other would be using precaution. See Guido Calabresi, Transaction Costs,
Resource Allocation and Liability Rules-A Comment, 11 J.L. & ECON. 67, 71-72 (1968)
(discussing rubber bumpers and fluorescent clothing as alternative precautions to
avoid automobile accidents).
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ones? Both seem equally unilateral. Moreover, if res ipsa is really
strict liability, why does the airline get off if it can show that it was
not negligent? The doctrine merely shifts the burden of persuasion.
Moreover, some applications of res ipsa do indeed occur in
"bilateral" situations where both injurers and victims could have
used precaution and where strict liability is economically inappropri-
ate.
15
I. COMPLIANCE ERROR AND LEARNED HAND NEGLIGENCE
Consider the problem of why drivers hit pedestrians. The
answers suggested by current economic theory would be unconvinc-
ing to most people. 6 The first reason is that the courts' "reasonable
driver" test involves averaging, so that drivers with above average
costs find it rational to be negligent.'7 For example, if someone
had an unusually high cost of precaution, for instance a
15 For an example of a case in which a court applied res ipsa to a bilateral care
accident, see Miles v. St. Regis Paper Co., 467 P.2d 307, 310 (Wash. 1970) (en bane)
(holding the defendant liable for a death caused by an unstable load even though the
plaintiff's deceased also could have taken precautions against its toppling). Strict
liability is inappropriate in the bilateral (orjoint care) case, because it encourages one
of the parties (whoever is not liable) to throw precaution to the wind. See A. Mitchell
Polinsky, Strict Liability vs. Negligence in a Market Setting, 70 AM. ECON. REV. 363, 367
(1980) (advocating adding a defense of contributory negligence to a strict liability rule
so that the victim takes the correct amount of precaution); Steven Shavell, Strict
Liability Versus Negligence, 9J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 7 n.1l (1980) ("It is of course clear that
under strict liability without the defense [of contributory negligence] the outcome is
inefficient, for victims would have no motive to take care.").
16 Landes and Posner summarized these reasons in their leading article published
in 1981. See Landes & Posner, Positive Economic Theory, supra note 2, at 879-80; see
also PaulJ. Heald, Mindlessness and Nondurable Precautions, 27 GA. L. REV. 673,688-95
(1993) (providing psychological theory of why people are negligent).
17 For instance, about averaging, Landes and Posner write:
A related reason for expecting there to be some negligence cases, also
introduced into the economic literature by [Peter] Diamond, is the "average
man" or "reasonable man" concept of negligence law. Due care is judged
by the capabilities of the average individual rather than by those of the
particular defendant (again, presumably because of information costs). If
the defendant's capabilities are below average, the costs of his taking care
will be above average and he may choose a care level below the average ....
If an accident occurs, he will be held liable.
Landes & Posner, Positive Economic Theory, supra note 2, at 880. It would be especially
irrational for most people to choose to be negligent if they operated within the
formal terms of the now orthodox economic model, because this model contains no
cause in fact limitation. A driver's capabilities would have to be far below average in
order to make her want to be negligent.
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driver with a neck injury, that person might find it rational some-
times to disobey the negligence rule until her costs became lower,
as when her neck heals and she can again cheaply check her blind
spot before making lane changes. Nonetheless, it seems fairly
certain that low cost drivers (Richard Petty, Al Unser, Jr.? ) also fail
to look for pedestrians some of the time,' 8 so this cannot be the
entire reason. Are drivers with sore necks mostly the ones colliding
with other vehicles? Another possibility is an error by the driver
about the legal standard, 9 although this explanation also seems
dubious. Obviously, drivers know that they are supposed to watch
for pedestrians. A third account, which is becoming more popular,
is that judicial error causes us to think that people have been
negligent when they have really used due care.2" In other words,
the fault is with the courts, not with private parties: what courts
judge to be negligent behavior is not. Nevertheless, despite this
theory, drivers sometimes do fail to look for pedestrians; courts are
often right to find them negligent. A final economic reason for
negligent behavior is that precaution has a stochastic or random
component." Although most provocative, this explanation is also
" The evidence indicates that most people, not just a few, make driving errors.
As Michael Trebilcock has recently pointed out, studies indicate that people are
negligent frequently:
One study estimates that a driver makes 200 observations per mile, 20
decisions per mile, and one error every 2 miles. Those errors result in a
near collision once every 500 miles, a collision once every 61,000 miles, a
personal injury to some individual once every 430,000 miles, and a fatal
accident once every 16 million miles.
MichaelJ. Trebilcock, Incentive Issues in the Design of "No-Fault" Compensation Systems,
39 U. TORONTO L.J. 19, 31 (1989) (reviewing and analyzing studies) (citing LESLIE G.
NORMAN, ROAD TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS: EPIDEMIOLOGY, CONTROL AND PREVENTION 51
(1962)).
19 See Landes & Posner, Positive Economic Theory, supra note 2, at 880.
21 See supra note 2. Landes and Posner write:
Either the court or the injurer may make a mistake in applying the standard
to the facts. (Victims may make the same mistake, but their mistakes would
result in cases in which negligence was alleged rather than in cases where
it was found.) Mistakes give rise to the possibility that the parties will have
divergent expectations of the likely outcome of litigation and divergent
expectations can lead to litigation.
Landes & Posner, Positive Economic Theo7y, supra note 2, at 879.
21 Landes and Posner argue that,
[a]s emphasized by Peter Diamond, care has a stochastic (random) element.
For example, suppose that a potential injurer tries to achieve a level of care
y*, but his realized care is y = y* + e, where e is a random error term with a
mean of zero. Although E(y), the injurer's expected care, is y*, there will
be instances when e will be negative and y will fall below y*. If an injury
1994]
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most tautological. It says that drivers do not always look, because
at random they do not. Some theorists add that there can be a lack
of control that accounts for the occasional lapses. This last reason
for negligent behavior also seems odd. Does something like random
paralysis afflict drivers, and if so what explanatory power does this
assumption add?
In short, the current economic theory of tort makes the
prevalence of negligent behavior a mystery, and despite the variety
of nonnegligent equilibria that economists have devised, people fail
a significant fraction of the time to use the precautions that
negligence law ordains for them. 22 Economists have not provided
convincing reasons to explain why this is the case.
A theory of why negligent behavior is common can be developed
by starting with the Learned Hand formula. 2 The formula allows
people who have used reasonable precaution to avoid liability.
When further precautions would produce more costs than benefits,
the formula allows people to stop using precaution. At this point,
others (for instance, victims) become liable for any harm that
results.
Economists have also stressed the different nature of strict
liability. In cases where strict liability is applied, reasonable
precaution does not avoid liability; indeed, in many cases even
heroic precaution will not. Thus, the rule of strict liability will be
violated more often than the negligence rule. The negligence rule
immunizes someone who has used all cost-effective precautions; the
rule of strict liability does not. Nevertheless, some economists
occurs when y < y*, a court that ignored the stochastic element of care
would deem the injurer negligent. Because an omniscient court would take
account of the stochastic character of care and decline to find negligence
whenever E(y) = y* even though the realized level of care was below y*,
Diamond's is really a point about the information costs of determining
negligence in difficult cases.
Id. at 879-80 (footnote omitted) (citing Diamond, supra note 2, at 123-40).
' See Grady, Multiple Tortfeasors, supra note 7, at 656-57; Mark F. Grady, Why Are
People Negligent?: Technology, Nondurable Precautions, and the Medical Malpractice
Explosion, 82 Nw. U. L. REv. 293,310-14 (1988) (explaining how advanced technology
increases the amount of negligent behavior).
" The Hand formula was described byJudge Learned Hand in the case of United
States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947). Under the formula,
behavior is deemed negligent when the actor fails to use a precaution if the burden
of its use (B) is less than the potential harm discounted by the probability of harm
that the precaution would have eliminated (P x L). See id. at 173. It is generally
expressed B < PL.
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suggested that the rule lawyers know as negligence really contains
a pocket of strict liability.2 4 This pocket is the beginning of the
new theory of negligence. A pocket of strict liability within the
negligence rule is a place where violations are likely, because inside
the pocket even reasonable and sensible behavior could count as a
violation.
The pocket of strict liability within the negligence rule is not
what prior theorists have imagined it to be. For instance, Landes
and Posner have said that strict liability usually attaches when a
driver reasonably aiming at due care uncontrollably strays across the
center line.25 Nevertheless, when drivers have sudden attacks or
sneeze and crash as a result, courts say that there is no liability; they
do not apply strict liability.2" In reality, the pocket of strict liability
24 Guido Calabresi argues that:
A limit to specific deterrence... arises from the fact that individuals
cannot control all their acts....
It may seem ... that it would be very good to forbid people from
absentmindedly taking their eyes off the road while driving....
Even if the penalty for the act were very severe, if people could not
control their behavior the penalty would simply cause them to abstain from
the category of acts-i.e., the activity-that might give rise to the proscribed
act.
CALABRESI, supra note 2, at 109-10. Peter Diamond provides a detailed account of
"stochastic precaution." Diamond, supra note 2, at 123-25. His idea, similar to
Calabresi's, is that "in some circumstances people will be careless some of the time
no matter how much effort they invest in trying to be careful." Id. at 124. Landes
and Posner, who accepted the Calabresi-Diamond analysis, give as an example the
case of a driver who "tr[ies] not to stray across the center line, but because he does
not have complete control over his attentiveness, the car, road conditions, and the
like, the best he can do is to drive so as to make it highly improbable that he will
cross the line." LANDES & POSNER, supra note 2, at 72. Steven Shavell theorized that
people may be negligent because they are unable to control their "momentay levels
of care." SHAVELL, supra note 2, at 81. He poses as an example a driver who is
uncontrollably negligent "because of a lapse of attention, a sudden glare, [or] a
sneeze." Id. In the 20 years that have elapsed since Calabresi published The Costs of
Accidents, his theory about the pocket of strict liability has guided practically all
thinking on the subject.
2 See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 2, at 72.
26 See, e.g., Zabunoff v. Walker, 13 Cal. Rptr. 463, 465 (Dist. Ct. App. 1961)
(finding that defendant was not liable for crash caused by his sneeze); Moore v.
Presnell, 379 A.2d 1246, 1247-50 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1977) (finding no liability when
a driver uncontrollably strayed across the center line due to unforeseen physical
incapacitation); Balew v. Aiello, 422 S.W.2d 396, 399-400 (Mo. Ct. App. 1967)
(finding no liability for accident caused by defendant's sudden jerking of steering
wheel upon waking from sleep); see aso Filippone v. Reisenburger, 119 N.Y.S. 632,
633-34 (App. Div. 1909) (finding no liability for reflexive act); Cordas v. Peerless
Trans. Co., 27 N.Y.S.2d 198, 199-202 (City Ct. 1941) (finding no liability for driver
who injured passersby on a sidewalk when he pulled the emergency brake and
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comes from making people liable when they have not achieved
perfect consistency. Actors are found negligent for committing
efficient "compliance errors." Economically, this is a form of strict
liability because it is a liability that attaches to social-wealth-
maximizing behavior.
The key to understanding the pocket of strict liability is
distinguishing between the quality and the rate of precaution.
Negligence law uses the Learned Hand formula to assess shortfalls
in the quality of precaution. For example, airplanes do not need
perfect cargo doors in order for their owners to avoid liability. If
a cargo door is reasonably well built but fails on one occasion, an
airline will not necessarily be found liable, even though a latch more
like the one on the Fort Knox safe would have stayed closed. If a
plaintiff suggests an improved design, the court will consider not
only its feasibility but also its cost effectiveness.17 When it comes
to designing cargo doors, the products liability rule is therefore a
modification of the Hand formula.
28
The frequency of cargo door inspections is also a product of the
Hand calculation. Thus, airlines do not need to inspect cargo doors
an infinite number of times in order to avoid liability. Courts
decide how many times inspections are needed by balancing the
benefits against the burdens. Suppose that the inspector checked
the door once, but that just before takeoff it somehow got loose.
The question would be whether the expected benefit from a second
inspection would be worth the cost. Suppose it would not be. The
required rate of inspection would then be once per takeoff.
Nevertheless, for each required rate of precaution, there will be an
actual rate of compliance that may diverge from it. It seems
doubtful that the efficient rate of compliance will be one hundred
percent of the required precaution rate. In a lifetime of cargo door
inspections, even a reasonable person may forget once or twice.
Within the framework of economic theory there are at least two
possible ways of expressing the conclusion that the efficient
jumped out of his car to escape gunman); Lobert v. Pack, 9 A.2d 365, 367-68 (Pa.
1939) (finding no liability when defendant kicked in his sleep causing the plaintiff
driver to crash the car).
' Whether products liability is somewhat different from negligence need not
detain us here.
28 Res ipsa is one theory of liability available in products cases. See, e.g., Tamura,
Inc. v. Sanyo Electric, Inc., 636 F. Supp. 1065, 1066 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (holding that res
ipsa action was available against manufacturer when cassette tape deck started a
restaurant fire).
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compliance rate is not perfection. One explanation is that because
the cost of precaution is higher on some occasions than on others,
courts derive an average of these costs. In the above scenario, cargo
inspectors will fail to inspect when their actual costs exceed the
average. Although plausible, this formulation is ultimately unap-
pealing because many inspectors will still inspect on days when their
costs are especially high.
A more appealing formulation is that people face a cost of
consistent performance that is greater than the sum of the cost of
all individual trials. Nevertheless, courts often behave as if they
underestimate the special cost of consistent performance; in other
words, they behave as if they underestimate "compliance cost."
They do not underestimate precaution cost.
In order to understand how the negligence rule works in
practice, the distinction between the precaution rate and the
compliance rate must be dear. The law of negligence is similar to
the rules of tennis, both of which have large pockets of strict
liability. In a championship tennis match, some balls are simply hit
too well to be returned even by an opposing player with extraordi-
nary skill. Many missed shots, however, are unforced errors: balls
that should be easy to return but for some inexplicable reason are
not returned. A possible strategy for a champion tennis player
would be to reduce the number of unforced errors to zero. I doubt
that even tennis champions strive to reduce unforced errors below
some (very low) rate. The perfect avoidance of unforced errors
would result in such a lack of daring play that the strategy would
become self-defeating. Judging from recent U.S. Open matches, as
a player strives to reduce unforced errors below some relatively low
level, further reductions evidently become too costly.
29
2 Although a player may lose because her low concentration level on a particular
day causes unforced errors as well as forced ones, sometimes daring play causes
unforced errors. For instance, in an early match from the last U.S. Open, tenth
seeded Richard Krajicek beat seventeenth seed Todd Martin. The New York Times
reported:
But in the end, Krajicek did a little more of everything in this oversized
match-bigger serves at the biggest moments, more winners, more unforced
errors, 16 break points saved, and 104 visits to the net-and the gambling
paid off. Martin, although steadier throughout the early going, was no
match for Krajicek's swashbuckling by the end.
Robin Finn, This Time, Novotna Loses with Less Flair, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 1993, § 1,
at 25.
1994]
900 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 142:887
Automobile driving is similar. It is impossible to drive a car for
any period of time without missing a required precaution. There is
evidently a special cost of consistent performance, and people
respond to this cost by trying to establish for themselves an efficient
rate of error which is (hopefully) low. Nevertheless, in most
situations judges do not recognize the special cost of consistency.
They assess a penalty for every miss, even for those that must be
efficient, judging from the way reasonable people behave. Thus,
drivers count on being negligent (they buy insurance) even when
they do not intend to be negligent.
The distinction between legally required rates of precaution and
legally required rates of compliance opens a new field of study. In
most activities, courts require perfect compliance; in others they do
not. Two cases will help to illustrate this point. In Kehoe v. Central
Park Amusement Co.,"0 the defendant set up its roller coaster so that
an employee stationed at a curve had to apply the brakes before
each car came around."' On one occasion the employee missed
for some unexplained reason, and the car went off the track. 2 In
upholding the plaintiff's judgment below, the court said that the
miss was negligence in itself.3 3
In another case, Myers v. Beem,34 the plaintiff sued his personal
injury attorney for legal malpractice.33 The defendant represented
the plaintiff in a separate claim against a hospital and one of its
orderlies for allowing the plaintiff's gurney to crash into a metal
beam. 6 The attorney visited Myers in the hospital shortly after the
incident, agreed to represent him, but forgot to file the complaint
until after the statute of limitations had run against the hospital.3 7
The court in the initial litigation granted the hospital summary
judgment on this ground.38 The plaintiff then brought suit against
the lawyer, who frankly admitted that he had "screwed up."3 9 In
court on the plaintiffs legal malpractice claim, the defendant
30 52 F.2d 916 (3d Cir. 1931).
31 See id. at 916-17.
32 See id.
!' See id. at 917 ("It is not necessary for the plaintiff to call for the application of
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in this case. If the brake was not applied to check
the speed as the car approached... it was clear negligence itself.").
s' 712 P.2d 1092 (Colo. Ct. App. 1985).






attorney testified that he "made a mistake." 40 This turned out to
be a good strategy for the lawyer, because the jury returned a
verdict in his favor. Perhaps he offered evidence that he was
normally careful. On appeal, the plaintiff contended that he was
entitled to a directed verdict: indeed, the roller coaster case would
seem to be a good precedent for that result. Nonetheless, the
appeals court held for the defendant, stating that among lawyers
there is no requirement of "infallibility."
41
The concept of a compliance rate seems useful if only to
characterize the different rules of law applied in the two cases just
reviewed. In the roller coaster case, the court required perfect
compliance, whereas in the legal malpractice case, the court gave
the noncomplying attorney a break by allowing the jury to excuse
his imperfect compliance. Although a survey of the realms of these
different rules is in order, no one would be seriously interested in
the survey without a fuller description of how important the
difference is. That is this Article's objective. I hypothesize that the
roller coaster rule is more common-that courts typically require
perfect compliance rates. In support of this hypothesis I offer a
modest amount of evidence beyond the roller coaster case.
When a surgeon forgets to count the sponges before she sews up
a patient, she may not present a claim of innocent mistake to the
jury.42 Similarly, I am unaware of any auto accident case in which
a driver who failed to stop at a red light or stop sign has been
acquitted based on the claim that he simply made an innocent
mistake. Courts seem to require perfect compliance from most
defendants.
One general exception is the "emergency doctrine." In this
special situation, the plaintiff or another defendant has created an
emergency that contributes to the defendant's compliance error.
The courts allow juries to find the defendant nonliable for a lapse
that would be clear negligence under other circumstances.
43
4 0 Id.
41 Id. at 1094 ("An attorney owes his client a duty to employ that degree of
knowledge, skill, and judgment ordinarily possessed by members of the legal
profession. There is no requirement that he be infallible.... Making a mistake is
not negligence as a matter of law.").
SSee, e.g., Ravi v. Williams, 536 So. 2d 1374, 1376-77 (Ala. 1988) (holding
defendant surgeon liable for attending nurse's improper sponge count during an
operation).
4 See, e.g., Riverav. New York City Transit Auth., 569 N.E.2d 432,434 (N.Y. 1991)
(finding that defendant was entitled to an emergency doctrine instruction to thejury
when the plaintiff created an emergency by staggering onto the tracks when the
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Indeed, the very fact that the emergency doctrine is regarded as an
exception lends support to the argument that perfect compliance is
the general rule. Another exception is the doctrine of momentary
distraction. When a defendant has distracted a plaintiff from using
a precaution that would have avoided the defendant's hazard, the
courts often excuse the plaintiff and allow her to recover notwith-
standing her negligence.
44
Based on the way terms are used in the current economic theory
of tort, "compliance error" seems to be the best name for an
inadvertent departure from the required rate of precaution. Thus,
a compliance error usually yields a conclusion of negligence per se,
whereas deficient precaution quality (or deficient precaution
rate45 ) has to be judged as negligence under the Hand formula.
This terminology preserves a large part of modern economic theory
of tort, which can now be seen as addressing situations where
compliance error could not be a large factor. For example, consider
a fire in which the injurer has failed to install a fire escape and the
victim has failed to install a smoke alarm. Current economic theory
accurately models this type of accident: neither party has used a
reasonable level of precaution, and that is why each is negligent.
subway train came into the station). A person in an emergency situation "cannot
reasonably be held to the same accuracy ofjudgment or conduct as one who has had
full opportunity to reflect, even though it later appears that the actor made the wrong
decision." W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS
§ 33, at 196 (5th ed. 1984); see also Amaro v. City of New York, 351 N.E.2d 665, 669
(N.Y. 1976) (holding that a firefighter injured during a response to a fire alarm was
entitled to emergency doctrine jury instruction). A party requesting the emergency
instruction is entitled to have the jury so charged if some evidence of a qualifying
emergency is presented. If, under some reasonable view of the evidence, an actor was
confronted by a sudden and unforeseen occurrence not of the actor's own making,
then the reasonableness of the conduct in the face of the emergency is an issue for
thejury. See Ferrer v. Harris, 434 N.E.2d 231, 235 (N.Y. 1982) (holding that children
darting into the street could be seen as an emergency, and a determination of
reasonableness under the circumstances should be left for the jury to decide). Any
expansion of the emergency doctrine amounts to a restriction of the strict liability
pocket within the negligence rule. See supra notes 24-28 and accompanying text.
' See W.E. Shipley, Annotation, Momentary Forgetfulness of Danger as Contributoiy
Negligence, 74 A.L.R.2D 950, 960-61 (1960) (stating that "some substantial diverting
circumstance must be shown"); see also Flynn v. City of New York, 478 N.Y.S.2d 666,
669 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984) (holding that the momentary distraction doctrine was
technically inapplicable in a comparative negligence jurisdiction, but that the trial
court committed no error in considering the doctrine when calculating fault
apportionment).
' Someone could mistake the legal standard and perform a check, for example,
testing of smoke alarms, less often than the legal requirement. This would not be a
compliance error as I am defining that concept.
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Nevertheless, most accidents governed by the negligence rule seem
to involve compliance error, which current economic theories leave
out.
A compliance error is a special kind of negligence which is not
the same as Learned Hand negligence. The Hand concept works
best for durable precautions-those that have a low compliance rate.
Hence, if the issue before the court is whether a barge company
should have hired a bargee, a good model for predicting the
outcome is whether the cost of a bargee was less than the reduction
in expected harm that a bargee would have yielded under the
circumstances. A compliance error is also not a deliberate failure
to use due care. If a driver deliberately blinds himself to pedestri-
ans, that would be willful and wanton negligence, and there are
special rules that authorize punitive damages and suspend obliga-
tions by others to use corrective precaution.46 Instead, a compli-
ance error is an inadvertent failure to use a precaution. For reasons
to be explained in the next Section, compliance errors are common
with high-rate precautions-precautions that must be used repetitive-
ly, such as looking for pedestrians, counting sponges, inspecting
machinery, and so forth.
In negligence legal doctrine, the perfect compliance require-
ment strongly correlates with precautions that must be used
repetitively. Consider another pair of cases. In Mackey v. Allen,
4 7
two defendants owned a building that had two exterior doors, one
leading into a medical clinic owned by a third defendant and the
other leading into a dark storage basement. Several weeks before
the accident at issue in the lawsuit, a woman trying to get into the
medical clinic entered the wrong door and fell down into the
basement. On the day in question, a fourth defendant, who owned
a pharmacy in the building, let a delivery person into the basement
but forgot to lock the door after the delivery person had left. The
plaintiff came along and mistook the basement door for the clinic
door and fell down the steps.48 The court held the clinic liable for
failure to put a warning sign on the door (Learned Hand negli-
gence),49 and the pharmacist liable for forgetting to lock the door
' See Mark F. Grady, Punitive Damages and Subjective States of Mind: A Positive
Economic Theoiy, 40 ALA. L. REV. 1197, 1200 (1989) (stating that punitive damages are
available for willful and wanton negligence).
4" 396 S.W.2d 55 (Ky. 1965).
4 8 See id. at 57.49 See id. at 58.
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(compliance error).5 0 The fact that the pharmacist was busy filling
prescriptions when he forgot to lock the door was never an issue in
the lawsuit.
In the second case, Ballew v. Aiello,5 defendant Gilmore was a
passenger in a car driven by defendant Aiello. The two were
returning from a large lunch, and Gilmore was dozing in the front
seat. Aiello pulled the car onto the right shoulder to avoid a car
that was traveling down the middle of the road. Gilmore, roused
from his sleep, grabbed the wheel, causing the car to go out of
control and strike the automobile in which the plaintiff was riding
as a passenger.12 The trial court entered judgment against both
Aiello and Gilmore as joint tortfeasors. 5s On appeal, the court
held that Gilmore was not liable for negligence because he was half
asleep at the time of his allegedly negligent act. 4  The court
analogized his act to an involuntary faint, for which there would be
no liability under numerous precedents that the court cited.55
When people, like the Mackey pharmacist, fail to observe
repetitive precautionary obligations, courts rarely entertain special
excuses.56 On the other hand, when obligations are not repetitive,
courts seem more inclined to consider excuses. Making people
liable for understandable (efficient, reasonable) lapses creates an
insurance component within the negligence rule. Strict liability for
compliance errors does not make people achieve perfect compliance
rates; that would not be desirable in any event, given the enormous
costs of perfect compliance. Nevertheless, when people are held
liable for imperfect compliance they become insurers in some
5 See id. at 59.
5 422 S.W.2d 396 (Mo. Ct. App. 1967).
52 See id. at 397-98.
53 See id. at 397.
54 See id. at 400.
" See id. at 399. Gilmore argued that "a submissible case of actionable negligence
was not made against him because, in grabbing and jerking the steering wheel, he
reacted instinctively and instantaneously to the situation confronting him when
roused from sleep and his action was involuntary and not volitional." Id. The court
agreed, explaining that
to create liability for an act alleged to be negligent, it must be shown to
have been the conscious act of a person's volition. He must have done that
which he ought not to have done, or omitted that which he ought to have
done, as a conscious being endowed with a will.
Id. In short, "[t]here cannot be an act [imposing liability for negligence] without
volition." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 2 cmt. a (1977).
' Myers v. Beem, 712 P.2d 1092 (Colo. Ct. App. 1985), the legal malpractice case
discussed above, is an exception. See supra notes 34-41 and accompanying text.
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situations where insurance could be more efficiently provided
through the marketplace. It therefore seems reasonable that courts
should strive to reduce this insurance component. For reasons that
will be suggested below, 57 and which I have developed else-
where,58 as technology advances and enlarges the insurance
component of the negligence rule courts might respond by
expanding the emergency doctrine and narrowing negligence duties.
Nevertheless, even if we suppose that courts wish to excuse some
compliance errors, there are enormous practical obstacles.
Uneconomic compliance errors are rarely distinguishable from
economic ones. Suppose a driver has slipped below some theoreti-
cally optimum compliance rate for looking out for pedestrians. It
would be impossible for a court to say whether the pedestrian was
hit during an economic lapse or during an uneconomic one.
Typically, compliance opportunities are independent. Which error
is the ultramarginal one that is efficient, as opposed to the intra-
marginal one that is inefficient? In this situation, the two are
theoretically, as well as practically, indistinguishable. Even for an
errant driver who was at or above the optimum compliance rate for
a substantial period of time prior to the error, the problem is
scarcely more tractable. How could a plaintiff rebut a defendant's
self-serving assertion that, before she lapsed, she was looking
carefully for pedestrians?
A legal system that wishes to avoid strict liability for compliance
errors-while maintaining deterrence-ultimately has to try the
defendant's character. In such a system, an erring driver or surgeon
could have friends and colleagues testify that the lapse in question
was reasonable given the defendant's normally careful habits. This
type of civil justice system would entail a much larger administrative
cost than the current system. Ultimately, increasing insurance
components (from new technology or other social changes) could
drive us to such a legal system, but they have not done so yet.
Judicial measurement costs are especially acute when efficient
and inefficient lapses are indistinguishable." Many slips are like
5 See infra note 78 and accompanying text.
s See Grady, supra note 22, at 332-34 (discussing possible negligence rules which
would limit insurance effects); Mark F. Grady, Better Medicine Causes More Lawsuits,
and New Administrative Courts Will Not Solve the Problem, 86 Nw. U. L. REv. 1068, 1092
(1992) (book review) (noting that the common law traditionally limits insurance
effects by "loading a more thoroughgoing fault standard into the liability rule" in
special situations in which defendants find it particularly costly to insure plaintiffs).
" On the other hand, a faint is distinguishable from some other slip, as is a stupid
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so many peas in a pod; the efficient ones look the same as the
uneconomic ones. This is the hallmark of what I am calling
compliance error. Because courts face positive measurement costs,
they impose liability on all compliance errors, both economic (or
inevitable) compliance errors and uneconomic (or reasonably
avoidable) ones. This is the strict liability component within the
negligence rule.
The idea of compliance error gives the concept of negligent
behavior a more secure home in economics. The hallmark of
economic theory is that people are rational maximizers. Yet, under
the current version of the economic theory of tort every time we see
negligent behavior we are supposedly witnessing irrational,
inefficient, or at least unaccountable behavior. If all negligent
behavior truly is irrational, there is enough of it in the real world to
challenge economic reasoning generally. Nevertheless, if we add the
concept of compliance error to the Hand formula, we get a
conclusion more congenial to economic tort theory. Much neg-
ligent behavior is efficient. It is compliance error that courts cannot
judge as efficient because of their positive measurement costs.
Because the consequences of inefficiently low compliance rates are
so disastrous and because avoiding them is the chief purpose of
negligence liability, they always deserve the greatest emphasis.
Nonetheless, courts hold people liable even when they have selected
efficient compliance rates but have suffered lapses that an omni-
scient judge would forgive. Courts do not inquire whether a
defendant was looking carefully for pedestrians before she forgot to
look for the one she hit.6 °
act by someone roused from sleep as opposed to one by someone who is fully awake.
In Robinson v. Butler, 33 N.W.2d 821 (Minn. 1948), a case similar to Ballew v. Aiello,
see supra notes 51-55 and accompanying text, the court held that a passenger who
grabbed the wheel was liable for the ensuing collision: unlike the defendant in Ballew,
the defendant in Robinson had not been roused from sleep. See Robinson, 33 N.W.2d
at 822, 824. For faints and other unusual slips, it is possible for courts to judge
whether they should have been avoided. Indeed, courts' measurement of unusual
slips reintroduces the negligence component back into the negligence rule.
' The efficiency of nonzero levels of compliance error must be one reason why
liability insurance for negligence is so freely available. Insurance companies generally
seem to avoid covering inefficiently created risks. For example, it would be difficult
for someone to buy insurance against the possibility that he will be arrested for bank
robbery or become addicted to cocaine. It is important to note, however, that some
compliance error is inefficient, and insurance companies seek to exclude it from
coverage if they can do so without giving their insureds doubts about whether the
company is planning to shirk on its obligations. The inefficient type of compliance
error comes from people who have selected inefficiently low compliance rates.
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II. WHEN Is NEGLIGENT BEHAVIOR LIKELY?
Assuming that courts impose strict liability for compliance
errors, we can predict when (and where) negligent behavior is likely
if we can predict when (and where) compliance errors are likely.
Indeed, there will be more negligence in places where the rate of
compliance is greatest. That is why there is more negligence on
Broadway in New York Gity than on Main Street in Dubuque: the
required compliance rate is higher in Manhattan, making the sheer
number of efficient compliance errors enormously greater.
The theoretical extensionjust outlined provides a useful tool for
analyzing res ipsa cases. Indeed, the foregoing reasoning is
embedded in courts' res ipsa analysis. As explained above,
61
compliance errors are more common than instances of true
negligence. 2 Nonetheless, both failures count as negligence.
In addition to purchasing third-party insurance for their possible victims, people
could respond to strict liability by increasing their personal precaution rates.
Someone whose required rate of precaution is 60 times a minute could aim at a
precaution rate of 75 times a minute. Nonetheless, even this strategy would still yield
some liability, and it also yields a degree of attention that does not pay out from a
social point of view. Despite the bad consequences of accidents, obsessive attention
to precaution still has its costs. Indeed, one of the main purposes of the cause in fact
doctrine is to keep people aiming at a precaution rate that approximates the one
assessed by courts. In the absence of a cause in fact doctrine, people would aim for
unreasonably high precaution rates because the liability system, as an insurance
system, is more costly than first-party insurance. People would try to avoid an
inefficient insurance burden through using inefficiently high rates of precaution.
Lawyers,judges, and trials cost more than claims adjusters and contracts. See George
L. Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern TortLaw, 96 YALE L.J. 1521,1534-39
(1987) (discussing the shift from first-party to third-party insurance and the
concurrent emphasis on additional safety measures); Priest, supra note 2, at 1349
(noting that when judicial decisions expand the insurance component of the liability
rule, people make inefficient substitutions); Michael J. Trebilcock, The Social
Insurance-Deterrence Dilemma of Modern North American Tort Law, 24 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 929, 946 (1987) (discussing the high transaction costs associated with torts
litigation). Whenever the tort system compels potential injurers to offer third-party
insurance, we should observe an incentive to substitute away from the obligation, or
at least to limit it. Indeed, if the courts were to eliminate the cause in fact limitation
on negligence liability, and all institutional responses had been made, one would
predict excessive precaution rates roughly in proportion to the excess of litigation
cost over claims adjusting cost. One would also predict excessively durable
precaution that economizes on compliance error and its inefficient insurance
consequences.
61 See supra text accompanying notes 45-60.
62 However, in the world of appellate reporters, Learned Hand-type negligence is
disproportionately common because the question ofwhether failure to install a better
air bag was negligent is easier for a court to determine than the negligence of the
failure to look for pedestrians.
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Therefore, if we can find situations in which compliance errors are
especially likely, these should be the instances in which courts apply
res ipsa.
Consider two cases. In Haasman v. Pacific Alaska Air Express,
63
the plaintiffs sought to recover damages for their decedents who
were passengers on defendant's flight from Alaska to Seattle. The
weather was normal the day the plane disappeared. When last
contacted, the plane was in the vicinity of Sitka, Alaska. The plane,
its cargo, and passengers disappeared without a trace. In Haasman,
the court held that the case could get to the jury on a res ipsa
theory.6 4 Walston v. Lambertsen65 was superficially similar, only it
involved a crab fishing boat.6" When last seen, the boat "was going
along just like a duck, easy, had all the time of the world.""7 As in
Haasman, the weather was good. Nevertheless the court held that
there was insufficient evidence to establish negligence on the part
of the owners.
68
Why did res ipsa apply to the first case, but not to the second?
In order to use the theory described above to account for the
different results, we have to believe that the plane crash was more
likely caused by a compliance error than was the boat sinking.
Indeed, there are several reasons for believing this is so.
Modem commercial airplanes are citadels of precaution.
Airliners have radars, radios, numerous backup systems, and a
tremendous number of monitoring systems and gauges. The
number and quality of these precautions ensure that commercial air
transportation is extremely safe.69 Most of the precautions are
durable: they have low required rates of replacement. Once a radar
system is installed, years can go by before a new one is needed.
Thus, it is unlikely that a compliance error will result from the
failure to replace the radar. Nevertheless, in order to be effective,
6 100 F. Supp. 1 (D. Alaska 1951), af/d sub nom. Des Marais v. Beckman,
198 F.2d 550 (9th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 922 (1953).
Actually, the parties had stipulated that if the trial court should decide that this
evidence raised a jury question, judgment should be for the plaintiffs. See id. at 2.
65 349 F.2d 660 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 980 (1966).
1 See id. at 661; see also Smith v. O'Donnell, 12 P.2d 933, 936-37 (Cal. 1932)
(holding that an air collision in which the plaintiff was riding with a barnstormer was
not subject to the doctrine because the accident could have been caused exclusively
by the other plane).
67 Walston, 349 F.2d at 661.
6See id. at 663.
' See generally Federal Aviation Program, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1421-1443 (1988 & Supp.
III 1991) (covering safety regulations and accident investigations).
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all the precautions depend on complementary precautions that have
much higher required rates. A radar system will warn of an
approaching airplane, but the pilot must monitor the screen
regularly in order to see it. An altimeter can show that the ground
is near, but someone must have remembered to inspect its calibra-
tion.
Nondurable precautions such as inspection, maintenance, and
monitoring have enormously high required rates on commercial
aircraft."0 One reason is the dangerous nature of flying. By virtue
of its speed, a commercial aircraft can encounter more hazards in
a minute than a person on foot might encounter in a day. In
addition, many people are aboard a commercial aircraft, which
further increases the loss that would result from a crash. For this
reason alone, the danger rate on a commercial airliner is a tremen-
dous multiple of what it is on a small, Cessna-sized aircraft. Under
the Learned Hand reasoning that courts use for this type of
problem, a high danger rate implies a high required rate of
precaution.
A second reason why inspection has such a high required rate
on commercial aircraft is because there is so much to inspect. The
possibilities for compliance error on a Cessna are fewer than on a
commercial airliner because there are not as many gauges to watch.
At the birth of aviation, when a plane disappeared without a trace-
Amelia Earhart's plane for instance-compliance error was much less
likely to have been the cause of the disaster than in the Haasman
crash."1 The reason is almost tautological: by virtue of the greater
safety equipment aboard, 'the Haasman pilots had many more
opportunities for compliance error than Amelia Earhart did."2
This theory suggests a paradox that we will see confirmed in the
cases. In most instances where technology has made an activity
unusually safe, that same technology has multiplied the possibilities
70See supra text accompanying notes 28-44.
71 See, e.g., Smith v. Pacific Alaska Airways, Inc., 89 F.2d 253, 254 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 302 U.S. 700 (1937) (holding that evidence of whether pilot was licensed is
considered in deciding carrier's negligence); Smith v. O'Donnell, 12 P.2d 933, 936
(Cal. 1932) (early decision holding that res ipsa did not apply to aircraft collision).
See generally Theresa L. Kruk, Annotation, Res Ipsa Loquitur in Aviation Accidents, 25
A.L.R.4TH 1237, 1242-1307 (1983 & Supp. 1993) (annotating state and federal cases
considering applicability of and liability under res ipsa in aviation accidents).
' See Hargett v. Gastonia Air Serv., Inc., 209 S.E.2d 518, 520 (N.C. Ct. App. 1974)
(holding that pilot's failure to cancel flight due to adverse weather when the aircraft
was equipped for flying in conditions of low visibility did not constitute proof of
pilot's negligence), cert. denied, 211 S.E.2d 217 (N.C. 1975).
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for compliance error relative to those for unavoidable accidents.
7
3
Hence, the paradox: accidents in areas with the most safety
equipment are the strongest res ipsa cases. 74 When a modem
commercial airliner goes down, it is a much better res ipsa case than
when a DC-3 disappears. If a nuclear reactor were to melt down, it
would be an exceptionally strong res ipsa case.
Crab boats are almost the opposite of commercial aircraft. The
required rate of precaution is lower because the danger rate is
lower. The boat travels more slowly into harm's way and fewer
people are on board. Since crab boat technology is so primitive,
there are many hazards that will lead to its destruction without
anyone having been negligent. Indeed, the cruder safety technology
leads to a higher rate of unavoidable accident than there is in the
air. Also, with more rudimentary technology, the required rate of
precaution is lower than on a commercial aircraft. Hence, the
possibilities for compliance error are lower at sea. A strong res ipsa
case is one in which the expected rate of compliance error is high
relative to the normal rate of unavoidable accident. The Haasman
air crash was that case, but the Waiston sinking was not.
The following Sections will elaborate and clarify the points just
explained. Some readers will have already asked, "Is it not possible
for technology to become so good that res ipsa cases against an
industry actually become weaker?" The answer to this question is
a qualified yes. Nowadays airlines are (probably) thinking about
installing computers to monitor radar screens and to sound an
alarm when a mountain or other hazard approaches. Maybe some
have done so already. When radar was first installed on aircraft, the
effect was to load risk into the negligence system.75 Although
radar made air travel safer, it also created a new opportunity for
compliance error. When a computerized monitor is installed, one
type of compliance error-a human failure to check the screen-is
reduced. However, there remains the age old problem of who is
watching the watchers. Computers also require inspection and
s I am using this term in the standard legal sense, which is an accident that is not
avoidable through the use of due care. Hence, most unavoidable accidents can
indeed be avoided, but at excessive cost.
74 See Higginbotham v. Mobil Oil Corp., 545 F.2d 422, 429 (5th Cir.) (noting that
modern technology increases the scope for res ipsa doctrine), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
830 (1977); Williams v. United States, 218 F.2d 473, 476 (5th Cir. 1955) (same).
' Cf. Allison v. Standard Air Lines, Inc., 65 F.2d 668, 671 (9th Cir. 1933)
(affirming trial court's finding of no liability when pre-radar commercial airliner
crashed into mountain during heavy fog).
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maintenance, which presents another opportunity for compliance
error that could offset the benefit from fewer pilot errors.
Nonetheless, the offset cannot be perfect, because then it would not
make sense to install the computer, which could well be the sensible
thing to do.
Even if the computer reduces on net the probability of a
compliance error, its installation could still increase the strength of
a res ipsa case. The reason is that the computer also reduces the
rate of unavoidable accident. Computers can process some
information that a reasonable human monitor could not. From this
point of view, some midair crashes will more readily be attributed
to compliance error than before the computer was installed. Here,
then, is the qualification mentioned above: in order for a techno-
logical advance to weaken res ipsa cases against an activity, it has to
reduce the rate of compliance error more than it reduces the rate
of unavoidable accident.76 Most technological advances have the
opposite effect.
There is a technology life cycle. Think of the introduction of
the airplane. In the beginning, res ipsa cases were weak because the
technology was so ambitious that the rate of unavoidable accident
was high relative to the rate of compliance error. Then radar was
invented, reducing the rate of unavoidable accident, but creating an
entirely new opportunity for compliance error when the pilot failed
to check the monitor. In this second stage, technology increased
the number of negligence claims and the strength of res ipsa
claims.77 In the last stage, res ipsa cases again weaken as the
computer-monitored radar reduces the rate of compliance error
more than it reduces the rate of unavoidable accident. At present,
most technological advance seems to occur in the second stage in
which res ipsa cases become stronger.
In recent debates about the tort system, some commentators
have argued that something must be seriously wrong when negli-
gence claims are rising at the same time as objective measures of
safety (fatalities per passenger mile) are improving. 78  Far from
indicating flaws in the system, this is a normal and usual relation-
7 Another way for an airline to weaken some res ipsa cases against itself is to
install a flight recorder, which reduces the cost of the exculpatory proof.
"' See Grady, supra note 22, at 293 (noting that "[rjevolutions in an industry's
technology will often impose tremendous new loads on the negligence system").78 See id. passim; Priest, supra note 60, at 1538-39 (arguing that the extension of
tort liability, while leading to additional prevention efforts by service providers, has
also led to a reduction in available insurance).
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ship when technology progresses. The invention of the dialysis
machine saves hundreds of lives each year, but it also adds a
number of negligence claims (from compliance error) that did not
exist before. The paramount purpose of the negligence system is to
regulate compliance error in the use of technology. It is therefore
natural that advances in technology tend to increase the number of
claims.
We need to distinguish the number of claims from the claims'
magnitude. The development of antiseptic techniques generally
decreases the magnitude of tort claims. Consider someone
accidentally injured in a hunting accident before and after Lister
conducted his research on the modern antiseptic.79 Once good
antiseptic techniques exist, negligent hunters will generally pay
lower damages. Although a technology may reduce the magnitude
of claims, it can still increase the number of claims. After the
development of antiseptic techniques, when someone forgets to use
them, there is a new negligence claim-against a doctor-which could
not have existed before.
III. THE LEGAL DEFINITION OF RES IPSA
The res ipsa doctrine shifts the burden of persuasion in the
negligence cases to which it applies." When a plaintiff brings her
case within the doctrine, the court allows the case to go to the jury
with less specific plaintiff's evidence about the defendant's untaken
precaution.8 l  Usually, the defendant must offer exculpatory
evidence that she was not really negligent or that any negligence by
her could not have caused the plaintiffs injury. The main way that
plaintiffs get their cases to juries is by proving that defendants
omitted specific precautions."2 Res ipsa loquitur is an alternative
way for plaintiffs to get their negligence cases to juries.8" When a
79 See 5 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 510-11 (Edwin R.A. Seligman &
Alvin Johnson eds., 1933) (discussing the work ofJoseph Lister).
'o See; e.g., McCloskey v. Koplar, 46 S.W.2d 557, 561-62 (Mo. 1932) (holding that
res ipsa doctrine creates an inference of negligence, not a presumption).
"i Res ipsa creates an inference of negligence. Res ipsa cases are strong or weak,
judged by how dearly the plaintiff's proof and the other circumstances suggest that
the defendant's negligence was the culprit.
82 See Mark F. Grady, Untaken Precautions, 18J. LEGAL STUD. 139, 143-47 (1989).
"In Bond v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co., 288 S.W. 777 (Mo. 1926), where the
train on which the plaintiff was riding was wrecked as it tried to cross a washed out
bridge, the court said:
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plaintiff relies on the doctrine she does not have to prove that the
defendant omitted a specific precaution.
The doctrine got its name in the famous case of Byrne
v. Boadle" when Baron Pollock of the English Court of Exchequer
allowed a plaintiff who had been struck by a falling barrel to get to
a jury without evidence of what precaution the defendant had
omitted. Although the plaintiff only learned of how the accident
happened after he woke up in a strange bed with a horrible
headache, 5 the defendant asserted that it was the plaintiffs
obligation to prove exactly what precaution the workers had failed
to use and that such precaution would have prevented the barrel
from falling.8" At this point Baron Pollock said, in Latin, "The
thing speaks for itself.""' The most obvious economic interpreta-
tion is that the normal proof requirements would yield too many
false negatives. If Byrne v. Boadle-type plaintiffs had to prove
specific negligence, defendants would have too little incentive to use
precaution. Nonetheless, William Prosser stressed throughout his
career that seeing the reason for the res ipsa doctrine is not the
same as seeing the cases to which it applies.
88
The traditional consensus is that the doctrine, though a
substantive one of tort, applies to cases in which the plaintiff
possesses only circumstantial evidence that the defendant's
negligence caused her injury. 9  Specific negligence cases-like
The rule of law applicable in such cases as this-call it presumption of negli-
gence, or res ipsa loquitur-does not purport to relieve the plaintiff of the
burden of proving in the first instance that defendant was negligent; it
merely relieves him of the necessity of alleging and proving specific negli-
gence.
Id. at 782.
159 Eng. Rep. 299 (Ex. 1863).
The Byrne plaintiff testified: "On approaching Scotland Place and defendant's
shop, I lost all recollection. I felt no blow. I saw nothing to warn me of danger." Id.
at 299.
8 See id.
I7 1d. at 300.
See, e.g., William L. Prosser, Res Ipsa Loquitur in California, 37 CAL. L. REV. 183
(1949).
89 See e.g., KEETON ET AL., supra note 43, § 39, at 242-57 (noting that "[n]egli-
gence, like any other fact, may be proved by circumstantial evidence"); Charles E.
Carpenter, The Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur, 1 U. CH. L. REV. 519, 529 (1934)
(arguing that circumstantial evidence should be sufficient to prove plaintiff's case);
James D. Ghiardi, Res Ipsa Loquitur in Wisconsin, 39 MARQ. L. REV. 361, 364 (1956)
(maintaining that the "principal difference between a res ipsa case and a specific
negligence case" is that the former relies on the inference of negligence from
circumstantial evidence and the latter on direct evidential facts); L. Ellis Griffith &
1994)
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United States v. Carroll Towing Co., Inc.'0 of the Hand formula-are
proved with direct evidence.
91
Since the distinction between circumstantial and direct evidence
is murky, the traditional scholars had difficulty defining exactly what
a res ipsa case is. From an early date, the courts outlined the res
ipsa doctrine as having three elements: (1) the accident should be
one that does not ordinarily occur without negligence; (2) before
and at the time of the accident the defendant had exclusive control
of the instrumentality that caused the harm; and (3) the plaintiff did
not contribute to her own injury or voluntarily encounter the risk
that led to it.92 In many jurisdictions, pattern jury instructions give
Benjamin E. Griffith, The Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur in Negligence Actions-Old
Solutions for New Problems, 48 Miss. L.J. 259, 261 (1977) (arguing that circumstantial
evidence permits the jury to infer the defendant's negligence); FlemingJames, Jr.,
Proof of the Breach in Negligence Cases (Including Res Ipsa Loquitur), 37 VA. L. REv. 179,
183-85 (1951) (asserting that circumstantial evidence can provide strong inferences
of negligence to allow thejury to find negligence); David Kaye, Probability Theory Meets
Res Ipsa Loquitur, 77 MICH. L. REv. 1456,1458-59 (1979) (arguing that circumstantial
evidence permits the jury to infer the defendant's negligence); Starling T. Morris, Res
Ipsa Loquitur in Texas, 26 TEX. L. REV. 257,258 (1948) (positing that "negligence may
be established by circumstantial evidence as well as by direct evidence"); John F.
Thorne, III, Comment, Mathematics, Fuzzy Negligence, and the Logic of Res Ipsa Loquitur,
75 Nw. U. L. REv. 147 (1980).
9 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947).
91 Consider the theory presented in the Prosser and Keeton hornbook. See
KEETON ET AL., supra note 43, at 160-262. The treatise breaks the breach of duty
issue into two questions: the "standard of conduct" and "proof." The authors then
dedicate a separate chapter to each. The basic point made by these chapters is that
determining whether there was a breach of duty is a two-step process: courts first
determine the standard of conduct; they then examine whether the defendant's
conduct measured up to it. See id. The authors say that the key concept for the
standard of conduct is the reasonable person, and they canvass her attributes at some
length (she never forgets, she is normally intelligent, etc.). See id. at 173-85. In the
subsequent chapter on proof, the authors describe the different roles of the judge
and thejury, define "legal presumption," and then launch into a discussion of res ipsa
loquitur. The difference between res ipsa and the other kind of negligence (which
the authors do not immediately name) corresponds to the difference between
circumstantial and direct evidence. See id. at 242-48. Many pages later, toward the
end of the chapter, the authors describe the (waning) rule in some states that the
plaintiff cannot rely on res ipsa if she has pleaded or proved "specific negligence."
Id. at 260-61. Here, we finally get the name of the kind of negligence that should be
contrasted with res ipsa, but the authors do not give it such a large role. Their idea
is that negligence can be proven by evidence that is so direct and convincing-in their
words, evidence so "specific"-that any application of res ipsa would be superfluous.
The same basic division of the negligence question between the standard of
conduct and proof exists in RICHARD A. EPSTEIN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON
TORTS 119-267 (4th ed. 1984); MARC A. FRANKLN & ROBERT L. RABIN, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON TORT LAW AND ALTERNATIVES (4th ed. 1987); and W. PAGE KEETON
ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORT AND ACCIDENT LAw 155-251 (1983).
' The first case that I have found outlining this gloss is Carpue v. London &
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plaintiffs the opportunity to have the jury instructed on the
"conditional res ipsa doctrine." If the jury finds that each element
is satisfied, it is entitled, but not required, to find the defendant
liable."3 An appellate case upholding this type of ajury instruction
Brighton Ry. Co., 114 Eng. Rep. 1431 (K.B. 1844). A somewhat later English case
glossed the doctrine as applicable when "the thing is... under the management of
the defendant or his servants, and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of
things does not happen if those who have the management use proper care." Scott
v. London & St. Katherine Docks Co., 159 Eng. Rep. 665, 667 (Ex. 1865). A later
American test of the application of res ipsa requires the plaintiff to prove "(1) that
there was an accident; (2) that the thing or instrumentality which caused the accident
was at the time of and prior thereto under the exclusive control and management of
the defendant; (3) that the accident was such that in the ordinary course of events,
the defendant using ordinary care, the accident would not have happened." Larson
v. St. Francis Hotel, 188 P.2d 513, 514 (Cal. Ct. App. 1948); see also Miles v. St. Regis
Paper Co., 467 P.2d 307, 309 (Wash. 1970) (en banc) (applying a similar three-part
test).
"An illustrative "conditional" res ipsa case is Gannon v. Elliot, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d
86 (Dist. Ct. App. 1993), in which the plaintiff originally consulted the defendant, a
surgeon, to replace part of her right hip joint. For more than a year after the
surgery, the plaintiff complained of pain. The plaintiff sought further medical
treatment and ultimately had her entire right hip replaced by another doctor. During
the second procedure, the doctor found a gray rubber cap from a surgical instrument
lodged in plaintiff's hip socket. See id. at 87-88. In her negligence action against the
first doctor, the trial court instructed the jury under California pattern jury
instructions:
No. 6.35:
"You must decide the following questions concerning the injury
involved in this case: [1 Is it the kind of injury which ordinarily does not
occur in the absence of negligence? [ ] Whether the injury was one which
ordinarily does not occur in the absence of negligence is to be determined
from the evidence presented in this trial by physicians and surgeons called
as expert witnesses .... [ ] If, and only if, you find that the plaintiff's
injury was of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of
negligence; that it was caused while the plaintiff was exclusively under the
care or control of defendant; and that it was not due to any voluntary action
or contribution by the plaintiff which was the legal cause of the injury you
are instructed as follows: [BAJI No. 4.02.]"
No. 4.02:
"From the happening of the injury involved in this case, you
may draw an inference that a legal cause of the occurrence was
some negligent conduct on the part of the defendant. [ ]
However, you shall not find that a legal cause of the occurrence
was some negligent conduct on the part of the defendant unless
you believe, after weighing all the evidence in the case and
drawing such inferences therefrom as you believe are warranted,
that it is more probable than not that the occurrence was caused
by some negligent conduct on the part of the defendant."
Id. at 88-89 (alteration in original) (quoting CAL. JURY INST. CIrv. 4.02, 6.35). This is
a special conditional res ipsa instruction that is proper for cases involving arcane
medical injuries in whichjuries must depend on expert testimony to know whether
1994]
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is obviously a res ipsa one-and that is true whether the evidence of
negligence was circumstantial or direct. This jury instruction
definition of the doctrine may be too narrow, however. For
instance, it excludes Byrne v. Boadle,94 where the res ipsa jury
instruction was not given because the instruction had not yet been
invented.95
At the pleading stage, a modern litigant might plead the
elements of the res ipsa doctrine, which would make it clear to the
other side and to the court that she intends to rely on it.96 In
some jurisdictions, a plaintiff can plead specific negligence and res
ipsa as alternative counts.17  The oldest practice requires the
plaintiff to choose between specific negligence and res ipsa at the
pleading stage."8 Although pleading requirements have generally
the injury is ordinarily caused by the doctor's negligence. After the jury returned a
verdict for the defendant, the plaintiff appealed on the ground that the conditional
instruction actually given was error because the jury should not have been told in
paragraph two of the instruction that it was limited to "the evidence presented in this
trial by physicians and surgeons called as expert witnesses." Id. at 89. The court
reversed the verdict, finding that facts of the case were comprehensible to the jurors,
so that they should not have been told to refrain from relying on their own
knowledge to determine whether surgical caps are ordinarily left in patient when the
surgeons have been careful. See id. at 91-92.
9 159 Eng. Rep. 299 (Ex. 1863).
9 See supra text accompanying notes 84-87.
In manyjurisdictions, a plaintiff does not have to plead the elements of res ipsa.
See, e.g., Stalter v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 669 S.W.2d 460, 462 (Ark. 1984) (rejecting
defendant's claim that plaintiff needed to plead res ipsa loquitur). Nonetheless, some
jurisdictions hold that the plaintiff must give the other side notice at trial that she is
relying on the doctrine. See Lloyde v. West Midlands Gas Bd., [1971] 1 W.L.R. 749,
753 (Eng. C.A.) (ordering new trial because plaintiff did not give adequate notice to
defendant that he intended to rely on doctrine).
97 See, e.g., Quintal v. Laurel Grove Hosp., 397 P.2d 161 (Cal. 1964) (holding that
alternative specific negligence and res ipsa applies where deceased's heart stopped
during surgery and defendants were slow in restarting it).
' See Bird v. Great Northern Ry., 28 L.J. Exch. 3, 3 (1858) (plaintiff who had
pleaded specific untaken precaution, namely the defendant's failure to maintain its
rails, could not rely on inference of negligence then available in other carrier cases).
Later cases held that a plaintiffs pleading of specific untaken precautions bound her
to a specific negligence theory. See CHARLES E. CLARK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
CODE PLEADING 310-11 (2d ed. 1947); The Great Northern, 251 F. 826 (9th Cir.
1918); White v. Chicago, Great Western R.R., 246 F. 427 (8th Cir. 1917); Pate
v. Dumbauld, 250 S.W. 49 (Mo. 1923); Thompson v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry.,
274 S.W. 531 (Mo. Ct. App. 1925); Bogrees v. Wabash Ry., 266 S.W. 333 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1924); Wichita Valley Ry. v. Helms, 261 S.W. 225 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924); see also
Forest L. Bedell, Pleading Negligence in Iowa, 16 IOwA L. REv. 480, 490-93 (1931).
Much of the early law of res ipsa loquitur was oriented around the question of
when it was permissible for the plaintiff to plead the defendant's negligence in
general terms. See Barbieri v. Law, 287 P. 464, 465 (Cal. 1930) (upholding a
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loosened, the distinction between specific and general negligence
still seems the best definition of the res ipsa doctrine. With specific
negligence the plaintiff relies on particular untaken precautions
9
These become the organizers of her case."' If the plaintiff had
said, "The defendant negligently failed to install a spark arrester on
its locomotive," it would be a specific negligence case.01 If she
has instead maintained, "The defendant constructed and managed
its locomotive so uncarefully and unskillfully that fire escaped to the
plaintiffs fields," it is a res ipsa case. 02 Under this distinction,
complaint alleging negligence in general terms); Board of Comm'rs v. Huffman,
31 N.E. 570, 571 (Ind. 1892); Grinde v. M. & St. P. Ry., 42 Iowa 376, 377 (1876);
Kuchcinski v. Curtis, 231 N.W. 569, 570 (Mich. 1930); McCauley v. Davidson,
10 Minn. 418,422 (1865); Davis v. Guarnieri, 15 N.E. 350,351,358 (Ohio 1887). But
see Ierardi v. Farmers Trust Co., 151 A. 822, 824 (Del. Super. Ct. 1928) (holding
general allegations insufficient); Bogart's Adm'x v. City of Newport, 28 S.W.2d 489,
490 (Ky. Ct. App. 1930) (noting that when pleader attempts to specify negligence,
facts so specified must state cause of action).
Other res ipsa cases using the general negligence terminology are Gish v. Los
Angeles Ry., 90 P.2d 792 (Cal. 1939); Bartol v. City of Boston, 156 N.E. 844 (Mass.
1927); Bibeau v. Fred W. Pearce Corp., 217 N.W. 374 (Minn. 1928); Toroian v.
Parkview Amusement Co., 56 S.W.2d 134 (Mo. 1932); Hulen v. Wheelock,
300 S.W. 479 (Mo. 1927); Meade v. Missouri Water & Steam Supply Co., 300 S.W.
515 (Mo. 1927).
99 In specific negligence cases, the plaintiff often has alternative theories of the
defendant's untaken precaution. See, e.g., Ford v. Trident Fisheries Co., 122 N.E. 389,
390 (Mass. 1919) (defendant failed to put a rail on the steps from which the plaintiff
fell and also failed to suspend life boat from davits); Cooley v. Public Serv. Co.,
10 A.2d 673, 675 (N.H. 1940) (plaintiff theorizing that defendant power company
could have prevented the harm she sustained from a loud noise that came over her
telephone wire either by placing a wire mesh basket beneath the defendant power
company's wires where they crossed the telephone company's wires or by insulating
the wires); Nussbaum v. Lacopo, 265 N.E.2d 762,764 (N.Y. 1970) (rejectingclaim that
defendant golfer failed to use due care either in hitting golf ball or in failing to shout
"Fore"); Acton v. Reed, 93 N.Y.S. 911,913-14 (App. Div. 1905) (defendant hotel failed
to have standpipe, failed to have maps indicating fire exits, and also failed to unlock
interior staircase, although none of these untaken precautions were a cause in fact of
plaintiff's death); Stacy v. Knickerbocker Ice Co., 54 N.W. 1091, 1091-92 (Wis. 1893)
(holding that although plaintiff, whose horses drowned in ice-cutting operation,
alleged that defendant failed to provide a fence around thin ice, a warning to driver,
or lifesaving equipment, none of these untaken precautions were simultaneously a
breach of duty and a cause in fact of the horses' drowning).
0 This point is developed at length in Grady, supra note 82 (discussing ways in
which untaken precautions define the analysis of negligence cases).
101 See Sellwood v. London, M. & S. Ry., 175 L.T.R. 366,367 (K.B. 1946) (referring
to plaintiffs negligence allegations as "specific allegations"); see also St. Joseph &
D.C.R.R. v. Chase, 11 Kan. 47,55 (1873); Kalbfleisch v. LongIsland R.R., 7 N.E. 557,
557-58 (N.Y. 1886); Parker v. London & N.E. Ry., 175 L.T.R. 137, 137 (K.B. 1945);
Freemantle v. London & N.W. Ry., 5 L.T.R. 556, 556 (C.P. 1861).
lOS Such a case would be like Aldridge v. Great Western Ry., 133 Eng. Rep. 1246
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Byrne v. Boadle was not the first res ipsa case. General negligence
was well known to the courts prior to 1863 in common carrier
cases. 08 Byrne was revolutionary because it was the first non-
carrier case in which a plaintiff got to a jury without proving what
the defendant's untaken precaution was.
The purely formal distinctionjust outlined avoids a problem that
the traditional theorists did not solve: some negligence cases
depend exclusively on circumstantial evidence but are nonetheless
tried on a specific negligence theory.'0 4 How do these cases fit
into the traditional dichotomy? The traditional scholars never
answered this question.
10 5
(C.P. 1841). The plaintiff's bean stack was ignited by the defendants' locomotive.
The plaintiff's complaint for trespass on the case did not allege any specific acts of
negligence but only that
the defendants, by their ... servants and agents, then and there, so carelessly,
negligently, and improperly managed and directed their... steam-carriage and
engine, and the said fire and igneous matter therein then contained... that by
and through the carelessness, negligence, and improper conduct of the
defendants, by their... servants and agents in that behalf, divers sparks of
fire.., and igneous matter then and there passed, and flew from and out
of the ... steam-carriage and engine of the defendants to, into and upon
the ... stack of the plaintiff [which was] wholly burnt ....
Id. at 1247 (emphasis added). After the defendant showed that its engine and boilers
were of the customary type, the court refused to direct a verdict for plaintiff, finding
instead that the plaintiff's evidence of negligence (simply that there had been a fire)
was sufficient to take the case to the jury. See id. A similar case is Piggot v. Eastern
Counties Ry., 136 Eng. Rep. 92 (C.P. 1846), in which the plaintiff alleged that his cart-
lodge burned down in a fire ignited by sparks from defendant's train. See id. at 93.
10' Some early carrier cases applying the doctrine are Christie v. Griggs, 170 Eng.
Rep. 1088, 1088 (Nisi Prius 1809) (allowing plaintiffs claims to reach the jury on
mere proof that stagecoach wrecked); Stokes v. Saltonstall 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 181, 193
(1839) (holding evidence of stage coach accident and subsequent injuries sufficient
to make out a prima fade case of negligence); Aldridge, 133 Eng. Rep. at 1249-50
(allowing plaintiffs claims to reach the jury on mere proof that spark from
defendant's locomotive landed on his bean stack and burned it); Piggot, 136 Eng. Rep.
at 92 (similar to Aldridge); Skinner v. London, Brighton & S. Coast Ry., 155 Eng. Rep.
345, 345 (Ex. 1850) (allowing plaintiffs claims to reach the jury on proof that he was
a passenger on the plaintiff's train when it wrecked).
1°'See e.g., Johnson v. Harris, 530 P.2d 1136, 1138-39 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1975)
(explaining that deceased little boy could have entered swimming pool area in several
ways, but circumstantial evidence-a telltale peanut butter sandwich-suggested that
he entered in a way that made the defendant liable for specific negligence).
" Another problem for the traditional scholarship is how to account for the
modem rule that cases can sometimes go to thejury on alternative specific negligence
and res ipsa counts. See e.g., Quintal v. Laurel Grove Hosp., 397 P.2d 161, 166-67
(Cal. 1964) (allowingjury to find negligence under the res ipsa loquitur doctrine or
in the doctor's failure to take reasonable care); Sherman v. Hartman, 290 P.2d 894,
900 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1955); Hugo v. Manning, 441 P.2d 145, 151 (Kan. 1968); W.E.
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Although the relationship between res ipsa and circumstantial
evidence is not inevitable, there is a practical connection between
the two. Res ipsa cases often involve compliance errors, which
generally result from the omission of a nondurable precaution-a
missed inspection, a forgotten look for pedestrians, and so forth.
When a defendant omits this type of precaution, a specific negli-
gence theory is unattractive simply because an omitted inspection
usually leaves no direct evidence. Because a plaintiff typically
cannot prove with direct evidence that a specific inspection was
omitted, the plaintiff relies on res ipsa. By contrast, omissions of
durable precautions often have equally durable traces. After a fire
that destroys a building, it may not be obvious whether a fire escape
was inspected, but it will be obvious if no fire escape was ever built.
Thus, the Learned Hand formula and specific negligence are
generally linked with omissions of durable precaution, 0 6 whereas
Shipley, Annotation, Evidence of Specific Negligence as Affecting Reliance on Res Ipsa
Loquitur, 33 A.L.R.2D 791, 805-10 (1954 & Supp. 1989) (discussing cases which allow
juries to consider both specific evidence and inference under res ipsa). Under the
theory explained in the text, with alternative counts the jury is asked to assess the
specific negligence alleged using the untaken precaution approach. See Grady, supra
note 82, at 143-47. Alternatively, they are asked to assess negligence based on general
allegations that do not implicate the untaken approach, but which often do involve
assessing the elements of the res ipsa doctrine, such as exclusive control, and so forth.
When the doctrine is not available, specific negligence must be proved, and in some
jurisdictions also alleged, with particularity. See McGhee v. National Coal Bd.,
[1973] 1 W.L.R. 1, 3 (H.L. 1972) (finding lack of specificity in pleading which claimed
that defendant should have allowed brick kiln to cool "sufficiently" before sending
plaintiff in to remove bricks).
" Sometimes an accident's signature will indicate the omission of a particular
nondurable precaution. These cases tend to be tried on a specific negligence theory.
See, e.g., Powers v. Huizing, 157 N.W.2d 432 (Mich. Ct. App. 1968), in which the
plaintiff was thrown from a toboggan on the defendant's toboggan course during
warm weather. The evidence was that she was thrown where slush had been allowed
to accumulate. As the trial court succinctly said: "'The finding, by the court, of the
presence of slush at the bottom of the slide is tantamount to a finding that the work
of creating ice and the inspection made at that time was faulty.'" Id. at 434 (quoting
trial court opinion); see also Kehoe v. Central Park Amusement Co., 52 F.2d 916, 917
(3d Cir. 1931) (finding that failure of brake operator on "Sleigh Ride" to hit brakes
for plaintiffs car was "clear negligence itself").
Nonetheless, nondurable precaution cases are also tried on ares ipsa theory. An
example is Newing v. Cheatham, 540 P.2d 33 (Cal. 1975), in which a Cessna carrying
three men crashed in mountainous terrain, killing the occupants. The clock on the
instrument panel was stopped at 5:18 p.m.-the precise time at which the plane should
have run out of gas-and investigation of the wreck showed that the plane was out of
gas when it crashed. The trial court found the evidence of res ipsa loquitur so clear
that it directed a verdict for the plaintiff, and the California Supreme Court affirmed.
See id. at 44. It was obvious from the accident's signature that it had been caused by
someone's negligence-namely, that the pilot, who was not licensed, failed to check
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many victims of nondurable negligence are obliged to rely on res
ipsa loquitur.
IV. STOCK AND FLOW
The economist's distinction between stocks and flows can be
useful to understand negligence problems, especially res ipsa ones.
"Stocks" are simply quantities of something (such as inventory) at
a particular point in time. 0 7 A "flow" is the rate of change in
some quantity measured per unit of time (such as production).'
Obviously, economists are not the sole owners of these concepts.
If water is flowing into a barrel at a flow of three gallons a second
and leaking from it at two quarts a minute, someone who remem-
bers basic algebra could calculate the stock of water in the barrel
after ten minutes has passed.
The orthodox theory of negligence presents accidents as stock
problems with parties sacrificing stocks of precaution to gain larger
stocks of avoided injuries. Indeed, this type of analysis is quite
useful for many negligence problems. Nevertheless, the model of
negligence needed to understand res ipsa depends on three flow
concepts: the danger rate, the precaution rate, and the compliance
rate.
The "danger rate" is simply the number of hazards per unit of
time weighted by the magnitude of these hazards when they
materialize. Thus, the danger rate increases when either the hazard
rate increases (more lightning bolts per year if the roof is made of
copper)' 0 ' or when the magnitude of the hazard increases (greater
hazard per lightning bolt if there are explosives in the ware-
house)."0 Res ipsa cases tend to be strongest when the danger
the gas gauge. Had investigators discovered that the plane was out of oil, rather than
gas, the court probably would not have granted the plaintiff a directed verdict, since
oil problems develop much more quickly and are less preventable by efficient
nondurable precaution than gas problems.
107 See 4 THE NEW PALGRAVE: A DICTIONARY OF EcONOMIcs 506-09 (John Eatwell
et al. eds, 1987).
log See id.
109 Compare Hellweg v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 110 F.2d 546, 549 (D.C.
Cir. 1940) (holding defendant negligent for failing to use special precautions against
lightning at its installation at the Naval Observatory, which had a copper roof resting
on exposed steel beams) with O'Neill v. Hemenway, 3 So. 2d 210, 213 (La. Ct.
App. 1941) (affirming judgment that defendant was not negligent in failing to use
special precautions against lightning at site where strikes were rare).
11 Compare Prussak v. Hutton, 51 N.Y.S. 761, 763 (App. Div. 1898) (finding
owners liable when lightening blew up their explosives dump located in residential
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rate is high. As we will see, high danger rates yield high precaution
rates."1 These high precaution rates in turn yield the low rates
of unavoidable accident and high rates of expected compliance
error that epitomize strong res ipsa cases.
The "precaution rate" is the number of times per unit of time
that a particular precaution must be taken. As already noted, the
Hand formula is a good model of how courts determine the
precaution rate."' For any given precaution, the required rate
largely depends on its cost (also a flow concept) and the danger
rate. Thus, the precaution rate for observing pedestrians is higher
on Park Avenue in New York than on Main Street in Smalltown
because, assuming that the cost of precaution being roughly the
same between the two places, the danger rate is higher in New York.
The "compliance rate," in comparison, is the degree to which
someone bound by the negligence rule actually achieves the
precaution rate.113  In most negligence situations, the required
compliance rate is 100%. Someone driving down a country road
may have a required precaution rate of thirty observations a minute,
or 3600 required observations over a two-hour trip. 114  If the
motorist misses just one observation and an accident results, she will
be found negligent even though her compliance rate may have been
well above the average motorist's. She behaved efficiently, but is
nonetheless liable. This is the pocket of strict liability already
referred to." 5
The three basic flow concepts just described yield two others
that are key to resolving res ipsa problems. The first is the
"negligent accident rate." Obviously, the higher the rate of
compliance error, the higher the negligent accident rate will be.
Also important is the "unavoidable accident rate," which is the flow
neighborhood) with Tuckashinskyv. Lehigh & W. Coal Co., 49 A. 308,309 (Pa. 1901)
(finding owners not liable when lightning blew up a small quantity of explosives).
111 See infra text accompanying notes 116-24.
2 See supra notes 45-60 and accompanying text.
n Sometimes it is easier to think of the rate of compliance error, which is just the
arithmetic inverse of the compliance rate. In other words, if someone's compliance
rate is 97% (per unit time), her rate of compliance error is three percent.
14 Remember that the compliance rate is different from the precaution rate. If
a person is riding a tricycle in a grassy meadow, the precaution rate for lookouts
might be three times a minute; on Park Avenue the precaution rate might be 60 times
a minute. A 100% compliance rate in the meadow therefore requires much less
effort. Perhaps this is why most lawyers would judge a tricycle accident in a grassy
meadow to be a poor prospect for the res ipsa doctrine.
"5 See supra note 24-26 and accompanying text.
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of accidents that due care (including perfect compliance) would not
have prevented. A strong res ipsa case is one in which the negligent
accident rate is high relative to the rate of unavoidable accident.
V. HIGH PRECAUTION RATEs YIELD HIGH RATE OF
NEGLIGENT HARM
It may seem that when there is no direct evidence of noncompli-
ance, courts should assume that defendants complied with the
standard. After all, why presume that people acted badly? Actually,
courts often assume that people acted badly (that they committed
compliance errors). Courts require total compliance with the
required precaution rate, but they also realize that few people will
meet this standard, especially in situations where the standard is
most demanding. In res ipsa cases courts assume that if perfect
compliance with the negligence standard would have been especially
difficult, the defendant was probably negligent.
Consider the situation in Byre v. Boadle," where workers
were using a jigger-hoist to move barrels above a public sidewalk.
Because the danger rate was high, so was the rate of required
precaution. Once the workers had begun, there could scarcely have
been a moment when precautions were not required. Was the rope
still taut? Was the jigger-hoist still properly rigged? Was the barrel
approaching an obstacle that might jar it loose? These were
questions that the workers constantly had to ask if the people below
were to remain safe. Yet, so long as the workers complied with the
negligence standard, it was unlikely that there would be an accident.
When people move barrels above sidewalks, the required rate of
precaution is so high that little risk is left for unavoidable accidents.
Nonetheless, the Byre court assumed, without evidence, that the
defendant was negligent, and therefore sent the case to the jury."
7
What made that assumption reasonable?
Economists have a maxim: Tasks are more costly the shorter the
period of time given for their accomplishment.1 1 8 Courts applying
the res ipsa doctrine seem to follow this same rule. The economists'
explanation is that a longer time period allows use of all available
11 159 Eng. Rep. 299 (Ex. 1863).
The Byrne defendant had not produced any exculpatory evidence. See id. at
299-301.
11 See Louis De Alessi, The Short-Run Revisted, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 450,452 (1967)
(explaining that under orthodox theory, costs rise in the short run because some
resources are fixed).
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short-term techniques as well as techniques that are only available
over a longer period of time. 19 Thus, because there is a greater
set of techniques available in the longer time period, costs are apt
to be lower, as with any task where choice and flexibility are uncon-
strained.1 2 Applying this maxim to accidents yields a useful
generalization: High precaution rates imply low compliance
rates.1
2 1
A lapse is more likely for a precaution that has a required rate
of sixty times a minute (looking for pedestrians) than for one that
has a rate of once every 100 years (replacing a fire escape). The
high-rate precaution requires compliance within one second inter-
vals. In contrast, the interval for the low-rate precaution is
measured in years (one or two). Accordingly, there are techniques
available for remembering the low-rate obligation that are simply
unavailable during the one second or one minute intervals of a high-
rate obligation. Suppose that negligence law requires a building
superintendent to have the boiler inspected once every year. It is
unlikely that he will forget, since he has a year to remember and
ample opportunities to remind himself. Perhaps he will make a list;
maybe his computer will remind him. On the other hand, a driver
may have to look for other cars every second or two. Putting such
an obligation on a list would be preposterous, and for a computer
to beep at her every time she forgets-if that were possible-would
simply make things worse. Even relatively low precaution rates can
be demanding. For instance, a driver that is obliged to look for
pedestrians six times per minute cannot perform all six looks during
the last ten seconds of the minute. Nonetheless, even this standard
has more flexibility than one that requires sixty looks a minute. The
latter standard is so demanding that no rational person would
comply with it every single minute.
If courts follow the economists' time maxim, res ipsa cases are
especially strong when the precaution rate is high. With a stipulat-
ed rate of unavoidable accidents, a higher precaution rate implies
a higher rate of compliance error and therefore a higher proportion
of negligent accidents to unavoidable accidents. In fact, there are
119 See id.
120 See id.
121 There is an issue as to whether the precaution in question is event-driven or
memory-driven. As explained later, leaving the rate of precaution constant, the
compliance rate will likely be higher for event driven precautions than for memory
driven ones. See infra text accompanying note 182.
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two other reasons why high precaution rates imply strong res ipsa
cases. First, a high precaution rate reduces the rate of unavoidable
accidents. The more often precautions have to be taken, the smaller
the window of opportunity for unavoidable accidents to occur.
The second reason-really the converse of the first-why high
precaution rates yield high rates of negligent harm is that a high
precaution rate makes it difficult for an accident to slip through
required precautions. Suppose that a pedestrian is walking through
a museum. The required rate of looking out for people and objects
might be five times per minute. If someone or something stumbles
into the pedestrian's path and is damaged, there is a substantial
possibility that the damage was not negligently caused. 22 Each
minute there would be five relatively long windows in which a
nonnegligent collision could occur. Now, imagine that the
pedestrian is given an extremely valuable Ming vase to carry from
one part of the museum to another. Because of the higher danger
rate, the required precaution rate increases, let us say to fifty times
a minute. Under these new circumstances it is difficult for a
nonnegligent accident to slip through the net of required precau-
tions, because the net is now fine. Hence, as the rate of required
precaution increases, the rate of expected compliance error
increases, even assuming a relatively obsessive porter and the rate
of unavoidable accidents decreases. Each of these effects makes res
ipsa cases strong. Given a sufficiently high precaution rate, the
mere fact of an accident carries an almost irrebuttable presumption
that it had a negligent cause. Such would be the case when a
nuclear reactor melts down.
Because the Byrne workers were moving barrels of flour, and not
feathers, above a public sidewalk, the danger rate was high, implying
a high precaution rate. That high precaution rate implied a low rate
of unavoidable accident and a high rate of (expected) compliance
error.' 23 Therefore, Byrne v. Boadle was a strong res ipsa case.
Consider Higgs v. Maynard,124 decided by the English Court of
Common Pleas just three years after Byrne was decided by the Court
'2 In Block v. Opera Holding Co., 154 N.E. 761 (Mass. 1927), the court held the
res ipsa loquitur doctrine inapplicable to a case in which someone, probably a
concessionaire, spilled a pitcher of lemonade on plaintiff while she was in sitting in
defendant's theater. See id. at 761-62. Under the theory presented in the text,
plaintiff would have had a stronger res ipsa case if the liquid had been hot tea.
'" On the other hand, low danger rates will imply low precaution rates, and low
precaution rates will imply low compliance error relative to unavoidable accidents.
124 14 L.T.R. 332 (C.P. 1866).
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of Exchequer. The defendant and the plaintiff's employer owned
adjacent commercial houses in London, between which ran an
alley.'25 At the time of the accident, plaintiff was in the alley
loading a truck for his employer when the end of a ladder broke
through the window of the defendant's workshop above. 126 The
plaintiff, hearing the noise, looked up and was struck in the left eye
by fragments of falling window glass. 27  Although falling glass
seems similar to the falling barrels at issue in Byrne, the trial court
directed a verdict for the defendant, and the Court of Common
Pleas affirmed.
121
Why did the Higgs accident not speak of the defendant's
negligence when the Byrne v. Boadle one did? When people move
ladders within warehouses the danger and precaution rates are
much lower than when they move barrels over sidewalks, especially
when the only window nearby faces an alley. Unless the ladder
could jar a heavy coffee bag loose, the greatest risk would be
bumping into a fellow worker, which (unlike a falling barrel) usually
does not produce serious injury. The lower danger and precaution
rates in Higgs imply a lower expected rate of compliance error than
in Byrne.129 As was just noted, in Byrne the required precaution
rate was so high that it would be difficult for an accident to slip
through-assuming perfect compliance. A high (required) precau-
tion rate catches practically every accident and makes it a negligent
harm if it slips through. The rate of unavoidable accident in Byrne
was accordingly low. By contrast, in Higgs the lower (required)
precaution rate would let a significant proportion of accidents slip
through as unavoidable: because accidents can happen between
required "looks," if the looks are widely spaced there is a greater
chance of unavoidable accidents.
VI. ACCIDENT SIGNATURES
Accidents leave various evidentiary deposits, or "signatures," and
a significant part of negligence analysis involves scrutinizing these
signatures from different doctrinal points of view. Whether the
plaintiff's theory is specific negligence or res ipsa loquitur, courts





129 Remember that there was no evidence of specific negligence in either case.
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both stock problems and flow problems when they conduct these
analyses.
130
Consider a specific negligence case first: City of Piqua v.
Morris,' a casebook perennial. In City of Piqua, the accident
signature was a municipal reservoir that had burst from an over-
whelming flood.12 The plaintiff suggested that the defendant had
not taken the precaution of unclogging the reservoir's overflow
wickets.' The court, however, found that the defendant's con-
duct was not the cause in fact, because the flood was so great that
even if the overflow wickets had been unclogged, the same overflow
and bursting would have occurred.' Although City of Piqua
involved a flow in the most literal sense, it was basically a stock
problem-the court got its answer by comparing the accident
signature to the untaken precaution. Through precisely this
comparison the court concluded that the untaken precaution would
have made no difference in the actual event, so there was no cause
in fact.' Legal rates (such as the compliance rate, and so forth)
did not influence the analysis.
1" See supra part IV.
131 120 N.E. 300 (Ohio 1918).
1 See id. at 300-01. In the United States, bursting municipal reservoirs fall under
the negligence rule, rather than the rule of Fletcher v. Rylands, 1 L.R.-Ex. 265, 278
(1866), af'd, 3 L.R.-E. & I. App. 330 (1868) (holding that persons are strictly liable
for collecting hazardous materials which are likely to escape on their property). See,
e.g., Albig v. Municipal Auth., 502 A.2d 658, 661 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985) (holding
defendant municipality not liable when its reservoir, holding one million gallons of
water, leaked into the plaintiffs' basements and houses).
113 See City of Piqua, 120 N.E. at 300.
14 See id. at 302-03.
131 See id. at 303. In a similar case, the court allowed recovery where a large
cinder fell onto a horse from an overhead railway, causing the horse to start and run
over plaintiff. See Lowery v. Manhattan Ry., 1 N.E. 608, 609, 613 (N.Y. 1885).
Nonetheless, the same court refused to apply the res ipsa doctrine when a cinder
smaller than a pinhead fell on and injured a plaintiff, since plaintiff had not proven
that the proper safety appliance would have prevented the accident. See Wiedmer
v. New York Elevated R.R., 21 N.E. 1041 (N.Y. 1889). These cases were decided on
specific negligence grounds; indeed, the court envisioned a particular untaken
precaution, namely, a better spark arrester. The accident signature-whether the
cinder was large or small-had a bearing on cause in fact: if the cinder was large, the
accident surely would not have occurred but for the negligence, since a spark arrester
would have trapped a large cinder. If the cinder was small, even an improved spark
arrester might not have prevented the harm. A sufficiently small cinder could easily
have passed through any reasonable spark arrester that the railroad could have
installed, and there would have been no cause in fact.
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By contrast, in the famous res ipsa case of Ybarra v.
Spangard,3 6 the court was faced with a flow problem. The plain-
tiff underwent an appendectomy under a general anesthetic. Prior
to the operation he had never suffered any chronic pain in his right
arm or shoulder, but after the operation he felt a sharp pain about
half way between the neck and the point of the right shoulder.
Ultimately, his shoulder muscles began to atrophy, and paralysis set
in. The plaintiff sued all of the medical personnel who had custody
over him during the time he was unconscious. Obviously, the
plaintiff was unable to say what their untaken precaution (specific
negligence) was, and he was thus unable to present the court with
the same type of soluble stock problem that allowed the plaintiff to
recover in City of Piqua. Nonetheless, the court allowed the Ybarra
plaintiff to recover on a res ipsa theory.
37
To see the nature of the flow problem confronting the Ybarra
court, compare Farber v. Olkon, 3 s a case decided by the same
court about ten years later. In Farber, plaintiff submitted to
electroshock therapy, which rendered himjust as unconscious as the
plaintiff in Ybarra. As a result of the electroshock treatment, the
Farber plaintiff suffered several broken bones, and he sued those
who had custody over him during treatment.'3 9 The court, howev-
er, did not allow the injured patient to recover damages.
140
Accident signatures were important in both Ybarra and Farber,
but not in the same way as under a specific negligence theory.1
4'
When, as in Ybarra, a patient has suffered trauma unrelated to his
surgery, it is highly probable that the cause was some hospital
employee's compliance error. A paradigmatically strong res ipsa
case is one in which a durable precaution 142 is an almost complete-
ly effective method of avoiding accidents with the given signature,
but where this same durable precaution requires complementary
136 154 P.2d 687 (Cal. 1944).
137 See id. at 691.
1 254 P.2d 520 (Cal. 1953).
1s9 See id. at 522.
140 See id. at 526.
141 If Ybarra and Farber had been specific negligence cases, the plaintiffs would
have identified particular untaken precautions-maybe a better gurney in Ybarra and
better restrainingbelts in Farber. The question would have been whether the accident
signature was consistent with due care-whether a better gurney would have prevented
the trauma in Ybarra and whether better restraining belts would have prevented the
broken bones in Farber.
2 See supra text accompanying note 69.
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high-rate doses of nondurable precaution"" in order to be effec-
tive. Ybarra was closer to that paradigmatic case than Farber. If
hospital employees look out for unconscious patients, those patients
will rarely experience trauma to undiseased parts of their bodies.
Moving unconscious patients involves many repetitive precautions,
one of which is to ensure that excessive force is not used. Alterna-
tively, perhaps a hospital employee neglected a critical check of the
sidebar of the gurney, and the Ybarra plaintiff fell off on the way
back from the operating room. Whatever the compliance error, any
cause beyond hospital employee negligence seems unlikely.
144
Also notice that the Farber result suggests the importance to res
ipsa of the compliance error concept. It is quite conceivable that
better restraining belts or lesser amounts of electricity would
sharply reduce the number of broken bones suffered by electro-
shock victims. Nonetheless, the court seemed to insist that the
accident bear a signature of the defendant's compliance error-as
opposed to the Learned Hand type of negligence. The Farber court
noted that electroshock patients often suffer broken bones even
when no one has been negligent. Since there was no mention of the
durable precautions (better restraining belts, etc.) that could reduce
this type of harm, the court seems to have used the concept of
negligence in its compliance error sense.
The style of res ipsa analysis typified by Ybarra and Farber is
more subtle than the stock problem involved in City of Piqua. In
City of Piqua, the court was required only to compare the magnitude
of the actual disaster to the performance capability of an identified
untaken precaution. This is stock analysis; the Ybarra and Farber
courts were engaged in flow analysis. In both those cases the
question was not "Would a particular precaution have prevented a
particular harm?" but instead "What proportion of the time would
this signature be produced by compliance error instead of unavoid-
ably?" In City of Piqua, technology entered, but only to form the
basis for a static comparison of disaster with precaution capability.
In Ybarra and Farber the court's knowledge of the technology had to
be more subtle. The court had to estimate how often technology of
a given type would produce a compliance error with a particular
113 See supra text accompanying note 70.
14 Note that if the Ybarra plaintiff's surgical wound had instead become infected,
this would not have been a good res ipsa case, since infections can result even when
there has been no compliance error by hospital employees.
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signature relative to how often the same signature would be produc-
ed without compliance error or any other type of negligence.
Accidents take their signatures from the context of the technolo-
gy involved. Gases in which jolts hurt people are good examples
because such cases are often brought on res ipsa theories. Some
jolts lead to res ipsa recoveries; others do not. The distinction lies
in the technology. In Kohler v. Aspen Airways, Inc.,'45 the plaintiff,
a passenger on defendant's commercial airliner, suffered neck
injuries when the plane suddenly dropped 500 feet after encounter-
ing clear air turbulence. The trial court denied the plaintiff's
request to have the case sent to the jury on a res ipsa theory, and
the California Court of Appeals affirmed.146 Jolts to aircraft
passengers often occur even when the crews have committed no
compliance error, and consequently these cases almost always result
in no liability.'47 If someone invents a device that can warn of
approaching wind shears, more aircraft jolts will slip over into the
liability category, because then the inference will be stronger that
the jolt occurred because someone forgot to watch the readout.
Although to the jolt victim the mode of conveyance probably
makes little difference, elevator cases are much stronger for
plaintiffs than airplane cases.14 Although elevator jolt cases were
145 214 Cal. Rptr. 720 (Ct. App. 1985).
'46 See id. at 721-22, 725; see also Kelly v. American Airlines, Inc., 508 F.2d 1379,
1380 (5th Cir. 1975) (holding that res ipsa did not apply to jolt of 747 that caused
plaintiff harm, and noting that "[tihe overwhelming weight of authority has declined
to invoke res ipsa loquitur in air turbulence cases"); Gafford v. Trans-Texas Airways,
299 F.2d 60, 61-62 (6th Cir. 1962) (holding res ipsa doctrine inapplicable to airplane
jolt); Lazarus v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 292 F.2d 748, 750 (D.C. Cir. 1961) (denying
recovery forjolt resulting in hot tea spilling onto plaintiff); Cudney v. Midcontinent
Airlines, Inc., 254 S.W.2d 662, 667 (Mo. 1953) (declining to review jolt in flying
airplane as a res ipsa case); Sanchez v. American Airlines, Inc., 436 N.Y.S.2d 824, 826
(Civ. Ct. 1981) (holding that res ipsa did not apply to unexplained jolt on commercial
airliner). But see Nelson v. American Airlines, Inc., 70 Cal. Rptr. 33, 35-36 (Ct. App.
1968) (noting that neither party contested application of res ipsa doctrine, given that
airplane jolt resulted from malfunction of automatic pilot); Ness v. West Coast
Airlines, Inc., 410 P.2d 965, 968 (Idaho 1965) (holding that although res ipsa is not
available to plaintiff hurt by jolt caused by turbulence, plaintiff was entitled to
attempt to prove specific negligence based on airline's failure to turn on seat belt
light). See generally D.E. Buckner, Annotation, Liability of Carrier by Air for Injuly or
Death of Passenger Due to Downdraft Updraft or Turbulence, 73 A.L.R.2D 379 (1960).
147 See e.g., Kelly, 508 F.2d at 1381 (finding defendant air carrier not liable forjolt
caused by clear air turbulence).
" See e.g., Conerly v. Liptzen, 199 N.W.2d 833, 835, 838 (Mich. Ct. App. 1972)
(affirmingjury award for unexplained elevator drop); Williams v. Swissotel N.Y., Inc.,
542 N.Y.S.2d 651,652 (App. Div. 1989) (holding that res ipsa doctrine can be invoked
if plaintiff proves a sudden fall followed by an abrupt stop of the elevator he was
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weak res ipsa candidates before technological refinements perfected
the elevator,'49 today, if elevators are properly maintained, acci-
dents are very unlikely. Nevertheless, in order to prevent plunges,
frequent inspections, service calls, and repairs are required. Thus,
when an elevator does plunge, the probable reason is compliance
error. The jolt cases again demonstrate that plaintiffs' recoveries
depend largely on how successfully an area of technology has
reduced the incidence of accidents when people are diligent (that
is, are using the required rate of nondurable precaution).' 50
riding).
149 See e.g., Dobbins v. Brown, 23 N.E. 537, 537-38 (N.Y. 1890) (holding res ipsa
inapplicable where plaintiff's decedent was killed in rudimentary mining elevator).
o See, e.g., Belding v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., 215 S.W.2d 506, 511 (Mo. 1948)
(holding that res ipsa may be applied to case involving abrupt halt of a bus); Redmon
v. Metropolitan St. Ry., 84 S.W. 26, 29 (Mo. 1904) (noting that jolts on streetcar do
not normally occur if proper precautions are taken); Durbin v. Humphrey Co., 14
N.E.2d 5, 7-8 (Ohio 1938) (allowing application of res ipsa to case involving plaintiff
thrown from ride at amusement park); Annotation, Presumption of Negligence from
Throwing Passenger from Seat, 5 A.L.R. 1034, 1034-38 (1920) (surveying a number of
jolt cases).
Arguing, based on the low proportion of plaintiff victories in the appellate
reports, that airline jolt scenarios are weak res ipsa cases and elevator jolt scenarios
are strong res ipsa cases may be inconsistent with the Priest-Klein theory of the
selection of disputes for litigation. See George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The
Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 17-22 (1984) (arguing that
where the gains and losses are equal for both parties, plaintiff victories will tend
toward 50%); see also George L. Priest, Measuring Legal Change, 3 J.L. ECON. &
ORGANIZATION 193, 207 (1987) (positing that "plaintiffs' success rate is likely to be
greater than 50 percent where plaintiffs possess greater litigation stakes than
defendants and less than 50 percent where defendants possess greater litigation stakes
than plaintiffs"). A literal interpretation of part of that theory would predict that half
the aircraft jolt cases would be decided for plaintiffs and half for defendants.
Nevertheless, as already noted, the appellate reports reflect a disproportionate
number of defense victories in aircraftjolt cases when these cases are brought on res
ipsa theories.
Perhaps the reason for the disparity is that the Priest-Klein theory assumes that
there is no variation in the quality of attorneys. If some attorneys can predict
ultimate appellate results better than others, the success ratio in the appellate cases
will reflect the success ratio in the underlying population of claims, which includes
settled cases as well as litigated ones. Specifically, if defendants sometimes have
better attorneys than plaintiffs, the smarter defense attorneys will reject excessive
demands from their less savvy counterparts, and aircraftjolt cases will be litigated and
appealed to defense victories. Of course, for any given aircraftjolt, there may be an
equal probability that the plaintiff has the smarter attorney. A smart plaintiffs
attorney would settle this type of case for more than its expected litigated value
(which may be zero). But, the smart plaintiffs victory (a high settlement) does not
appear in the appellate reports, whereas the smart defendant's victory does. Hence,
the proportion of defense victories in the appellate reports diverges from 50% and
approaches the proportion in the underlying population of claims. In situations
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Paradoxically, the safer the activity, the stronger the res ipsa case.
VII. FACTORS THAT MAKE RES IPSA CASES STRONG
Anything that increases the required rate of precaution makes
res ipsa cases stronger. As already noted, there are two separate
reasons for this phenomenon.' First, a high rate of precaution
snags most accidents and makes them avoidable by due care.
Indeed, with a high enough required rate of precaution, it is
impossible to have a nonnegligent accident. Second, high rates of
precaution are especially costly to achieve. Hence, the rate of
compliance error increases with the rate of precaution. Therefore,
high precaution rates simultaneously reduce the rate of non-
negligent accidents and increase the rate of negligent ones. The
combination of these two effects produces strong res ipsa cases.
Although the precaution rate is key, it is useful to analyze cases
using some other factors as well.
A. High Danger Rates
High danger rates usually imply high precaution rates.1 52 The
correlation between danger and precaution rates explains why
dangerous activities, such as moving barrels above sidewalks, make
such strong res ipsa cases when they go awry. For instance, the
Marine Corps' accidental bombing of the plaintiff's oyster boat
during practice exercises over Pamlico Sound presented a strong res
ipsa case. 55 Dropping practice bombs is even more dangerous
than moving barrels, and requires such a high rate of precaution
that little room is left for unavoidable accidents. Moreover, with
where practically all the appellate cases of a particular type yield the same result (no
res ipsa recovery for aircraft jolts), the reports may simply reflect the dispersion of
ability in the bar and the positive search costs faced by parties to acquire good
attorneys.
Other reasons potentially explain this result. A disproportionate number of
defense victories could reflect a gamble by plaintiffs that aircraft technology has
recently improved enough so as to sweep some jolts into the liability category. A
stock market eliminates foolish investors more ruthlessly than the legal market
eliminates foolish attorneys and uninformed clients.
m See supra notes 117-24 and accompanying text.
"
5 See supra notes 109-11 and accompanying text.
.5 See Goodwin v. United States, 141 F. Supp. 445, 451 (E.D.N.C. 1956) (stating
that res ipsa doctrine is sufficient to support finding that vessel was sunk due to
negligence of the government); see also D'Anna v. United States, 181 F.2d 335, 336-37
(4th Cir. 1950) (stating that plaintiff was entitled to assert res ipsa theory after
auxiliary fuel tank dropped from government plane destroying his fruit stand).
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such a high rate of precaution, a fair amount of compliance error
is inevitable.1
54
Cases involving inspection precautions are especially well
explained by the danger rate. Compare these two amusement park
cases. In Wodnik v. Luna Park Amusement Co., 55 the plaintiff
bought a ticket for a carnival attraction, and the defendant's
attendant then handed the plaintiff a heavy, long-handled mallet
with which to strike a trigger in an attempt to launch a lug high
enough to ring a bell. When Mr. Wodnik swung the mallet above
his head, the mallet head suddenly flew off, leaving him with a
significantly less massive object than he had expected to wield. He
then struck himself a painful and injurious blow to his knee with the
long handle, for which he sued the concession operator. The court
held that Wodnik had stated a good res ipsa case.' 58 The required
inspection rate for carnival mallets is exceptionally high because of
the risk that loose mallet heads will cripple unsuspecting bystanders.
In the opposite type of case, Smith v. Caplan,5 " the plaintiff
accompanied her child on a merry-go-round and somehow injured
her foot. The court held that the plaintiff was not entitled to
recover against the amusement park operator without evidence of
specific negligence.'5 8 Smith is distinguishable from Wodnik on
15 See supra notes 121-23 and accompanying text.
5 125 P. 941 (Wash. 1912).
' See id. at 942-43; see also Reinzi v. Tilyou, 169 N.E. 101 (N.Y. 1929) (involving
a similarly high danger rate). In Reinzi, the plaintiffs were injured when the stirrup
on a mechanical steeplechase horse that they were riding broke off. The court stated
that the potential dangers of the steeplechase were serious enough to warrant the
defendant taking adequate precautions. See id. at 102. Although a steeplechase is
similar to a merry-go-round, see infra text accompanying note 157, the danger rate is
higher. See also Brennan v. Ocean View Amusement Co., 194 N.E. 911 (Mass. 1935)
(plaintiff injured while riding a roller coaster). The court in Brennan stressed that
roller coasters require a high degree of care, since the potential danger is great:
As the cars ran rapidly and without any means of controlling them from the
time they left the top until they reached the bottom, it is plain that their
safe and successful operation must depend to a large degree upon proper
construction of the tracks and their maintenance in good repair and at the
proper grade and alinement.
Id. at 912; see also Martin v. Sentker, 12 Ohio App. 46, 47-48 (1918) (finding
defendant liable under res ipsa doctrine when roller coaster fell off track).
's 425 S.W.2d 477 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968).
See id. at 480. A subsequent inspection supposedly revealed nothing wrong
with the merry-go-round. If the danger rate had been higher, this evidence may not
have been exculpatory. A case involving a similarly low danger rate was Nabson
v. Mordall Realty Corp., 15 N.Y.S.2d 38 (App. Div. 1939), in which the plaintiff was
hurt by a small splinter while attending a theater. Since harm from splinters is
normally minor, it is understandable that the court held that the plaintiff was not
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the ground that the danger rate on merry-go-rounds is lower than
the danger rate for "striking" machines. The lower danger rate
implies a lower rate of inspection and hence a weaker res ipsa
case.
159
B. Effective Durable Precaution
Highly effective durable precaution usually increases the
productivity of complementary nondurable precaution, and thus its
required rate. As a result, the crash of a modem commercial
airliner makes a much better res ipsa case than the crash of an
airplane that takes place at the birth of aviation. It was more likely
that Amelia Earhart's airplane would crash without negligence than
it is that a modem airplane will crash without negligence.
Lewis v. Great Southwest Corp."' is a case in which there was
little durable precaution available to the defendant. The plaintiff
visited the defendant's petting zoo with her grandchild and was
promptly butted by a goat. She sued on a res ipsa theory, but
lost. 6 ' Indeed, it is difficult to imagine a weaker res ipsa case.
Suppose, however, that someone invents a device that cheaply and
reliably monitors billy goats' emotional states and sounds a buzzer
when goats are about to charge. After the invention of this effective
entitled to recovery under the res ipsa doctrine and could only recover on a specific
negligence theoryby proving that the defendant knew of the splinter. See id. at 41-42.
"' In Korsak v. Atlas Hotels, Inc., 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d 833 (Ct. App. 1992), the plaintiff
was injured in the defendant's hotel when a shower head popped off and the resulting
stream of water hit him in the eye. See id. at 834. The court assumed that the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was inapplicable, and the plaintiff did not even argue for
it at the appellate level. See id. at 840 n.5. The danger rate from shower heads is so
low that a compliance error is unlikely and many of the harms that do occur
constitute unavoidable accidents. Compare Susman v. Mid-South Fair, Inc., 176
S.W.2d 804, 805 (Tenn. 1944) (finding plaintiff not entitled to res ipsa instruction
when evidence suggested that injury on defendant's amusement device known as "The
Whip" may have resulted from her own negligence) with Berberet v. Electric Park
Amusement Co., 3 S.W.2d 1025, 1030 (Mo. 1928) (stating that plaintiff was not
entitled to use res ipsa doctrine where she slipped on loose board in boardwalk
leading from defendant's merry-go-round) and Freda v. Lake Ariel Park & Amusement
Co., 36 A.2d 849, 850 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1944) (plaintiff who fell through rotten boards
in defendant's comfort station allowed to recover on res ipsa theory). The danger
rate, and therefore the required rate of inspection, was higher in Susman than in
Berberet. In Freda the danger rate was higher than in Susman, because water which
was constantly present on the Freda boards created a high danger rate that dictated
a high rate of precaution (inspection).
" 473 S.W.2d 228 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971).
... See id. at 230 ("[W]e cannot indulge a presumption of negligence from the
happening of the accident .... ").
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durable precaution, future zoo-goers would recover on res ipsa
theories more often. The buzzer would reduce the rate of unavoid-
able accidents, which would by itself increase the strength of
plaintiffs' cases. The buzzers, however, would probably require
periodic inspection and servicing, complementary nondurable
precautions with a rate high enough-even with relatively low danger
rates-to produce some significant flow of compliance errors. Given
the current lack of durable precaution against billy goat attacks, res
ipsa cases against goat owners remain weak.
16 2
If a precaution were perfectly effective and perfectly durable, it
would actually reduce the strength of res ipsa cases. One of the
worst res ipsa cases imaginable is the case of the disabled one-hoss
shay in Oliver Wendell Holmes's poem by that name. 16 3 The one-
hoss shay has since become a familiar concept in the economic
theory of investment, though not yet in the theory of tort. The
deacon's theory of carriage design was that no part of the shay
should be weaker than the rest. He scoured New England to get the
best oak for the spokes and floor, Settler's elm for the hubs, and the
finest steel for the springs and axle. The chaise lasted for 100 years,
outliving the deacon and finally passing on to his successor, the
parson. Significantly for the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, the one-
162 Because of the lack of durable precaution requiring high rates of nondurable
precaution, horse-related accidents are generally weak res ipsa cases. When horses
pulling Disneyland's Surrey with the Fringe on Top ran away, injuring a park patron,
a California court held that the jury was entitled to conclude that the accident could
easily have been unavoidable or the result of the negligence of someone besides the
defendant. See Kohl v. Disneyland, Inc., 20 Cal. Rptr. 367, 372 (Dist. Ct. App. 1962).
Thus, the defendant was able to rebut the inference of negligence suggested by the
res ipsa doctrine. See id.; see also Smith v. Great Eastern Ry., 2 L.R.-C.P. 4, 9 (1866)
(holding that a passenger who was bitten by a dog while waiting at defendant's train
platform could not recover by simply proving she had been bitten); Hammack v.
White, 142 Eng. Rep. 926, 929 (C.P. 1862) (finding defendant not liable on a general
negligence theory when his new horse bolted on a busy London street and ran down
a hapless pedestrian). A distinguishable case is McComas v. Barnes Shows Co., 12
P.2d 630 (Cal. 1932), where an actress employed to ride an elephant was able to
recover damages when the elephant's saddle fell off, apparently because the trainer
had failed to check it. See id. at 633. Saddles require periodic inspection.
Generally the presence of durable precaution makes res ipsa cases strong, even
when there is little evidence of what exactly went wrong. See Killian v. Logan, 162 A.
30, 32 (Conn. 1932) (finding defendant liable for plaintiffs injuries suffered when she
was descending a fire escape and a failure in its mechanism precipitated her fall to
the ground); Harrison v. Southeastern Fair Ass'n, 122 S.E.2d 330, 335-36 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1961) (stating that res ipsa theory created jury question when the plaintiff
received burns on the defendant's moon rocket amusement ride).
163 See OLIVER W. HOLMES, THE ONE Hoss SHAY 12-29 (Boston & New York,
Houghton, Mifflin & Co. 1891).
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hoss shay never required any maintenance."6 On its one hun-
dredth birthday, when the parson ventured out driving, the chaise
suddenly fell completely apart. There was a rumble reminiscent of
an earthquake, and the next thing the parson knew he was sitting on
a rock. (He turned and saw that the chaise had disintegrated into
a heap of dust. 65) Although the chaise, like a commercial airliner,
had highly effective durable precautions, the chaise, unlike a
commercial airliner, never required maintenance or inspection.
How could there be negligence at all under these circumstances?
The productivity of nondurable precaution was zero. The example
of the one-hoss shay is, however, obviously more fantasy than
reality. In the real world, durable precaution usually increases the
need for complementary nondurable precautions. Hence, effective
durable precaution usually makes res ipsa cases stronger.
C. Low-Cost Nondurable Precaution
Some nondurable precautions are very cheap, and that factor
can create strong res ipsa cases. For instance, in Swiney v. Malone
Freight Lines,'66 the defendant owned an eighteen-wheel truck
equipped with dual tandem wheels. As the defendant's driver was
travelling down the road, first one wheel, then the second, became
detached. The plaintiff, who was driving in his car, avoided the first
wheel but was struck by the second and was injured." 7 In its
opinion the court stressed that the tractor-trailer wheels required
frequent inspections. Moreover, checking whether wheel lugs have
loosened was both easy and highly effective. 6 In holding that the
evidence was sufficient to send the case to the jury on a res ipsa
theory, the court distinguished two other cases in which nondurable
precaution was less productive.
6 9
In Smith v. Fisher.7 ° the same court had found the case for res
ipsa insufficient where a universal joint or brake band suddenly
I" Only toward the end was there: "A general flavor of mild decay,/But nothing
local, as one may say./There couldn't be-for the Deacon's art/Had made it so like
in every part." Id. at 23-24.
"s "The poor old chaise in a heap or mound,/As if it had been to the mill and
ground!" Id. at 28.
1"6 545 S.W.2d 112 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1976).
167 See id. at 113.
6 The evidence indicated that when loose, wheel lugs develop a telltale ring of
rust around them. See id.
169 See id. at 115.
170 11 Tenn. App. 273 (1929).
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broke.17 1 In distinguishing this case the Swiney court stressed that
frequent inspection of brake bands and universal joints was not
nearly as productive as inspection of wheel lugs. Also, the inspec-
tion itself was far more costly: universaljoints must be dismantled,
and brake bands do not reveal defects unless subjected to x-
rays.
172
When compliance error is impossible, res ipsa is usually an
unsuccessful theory. Consider Bolton v. Stone, 17 in which the
plaintiff, standing outside her garden gate on the street that ran
between her house and the defendant's cricket grounds, was struck
by a particularly well hit cricket ball. Balls were hit out of the park
extremely infrequently. The plaintiff alleged two untaken precau-
tions: failing to erect a fence of sufficient height to prevent balls
being struck into the road, and placing the cricket pitch too close
to the road.'" Her third claim was that failing to ensure that
cricket balls would not be hit into the road amounted to general
negligence.17' In response to this allegation of general negligence
the court took up the question of res ipsa loquitur, as well as the
specific negligence put at issue by the two untaken precaution
allegations. 17 The specific negligence counts failed, as did the res
ipsa count, despite the superficial similarity that the case bore to
Byrne v. Boadle (the case of the falling barrel). 77 In Byrne the
harm very probably resulted from compliance error, whereas in
Bolton, compliance error was impossible: the batter was trying to hit
the ball out of the stadium. If any precaution was reasonable, it was
some durable one, like the two specific untaken precautions
mentioned in the plaintiffs declaration.
In cases where nondurable precaution is unproductive, res ipsa
is a poor legal theory. 17  For instance, in Ash v. Childs Dining
17 See id. at 282.
7 See Swiney, 545 S.W.2d at 115.
' 1951 App. Cas. 850.
174 See id. at 852.
" It was "failure to ensure that cricket balls would not be hit into the said road."
Id. at 851.
16 See id. at 857-60.
17 See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
" See Toroian v. Parkview Amusement Co., 56 S.W.2d 134, 136-37 (Mo. 1932)
(upholding verdict in favor of defendant after res ipsa instruction in case in which
amusement ride would, on occasion suddenly stop after cable went off guides, and
it appeared that no amount of inspection or maintenance would prevent this
intermittent problem); Flamm v. Coney Island Co., 195 N.E. 401,402 (Ohio Ct. App.
1934) (defendant not liable for staphylococcic infection that the plaintiff received in
defendant's swimming pool after it appeared that defendant used chlorine).
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Hall Co.'79 the plaintiff was injured after swallowing a tack con-
tained in the defendant's blueberry pie. The tack was of the same
type used to fasten the oldtime containers in which the defendant
purchased blueberries. In reversing the judgment that the plaintiff
received below, the court thought it probable that the tack was
actually embedded in a blueberry.' ° The plaintiff's res ipsa case
was therefore weak because nondurable precaution was unproduc-
tive.' 81 A stronger res ipsa case would have resulted if the tack
was too large to have been embedded in a blueberry.
D. Memory-Driven, as Opposed to Event-Driven, Precaution
One of the costs of compliance is remembering to take repeti-
tive precaution. This cost is reduced if events remind the actor of
the need to use precaution. In such situations, compliance error
will be less, because the cost of compliance is less.
Besides being more or less durable, precautions also differ
according to their stimulus. Some precautions are triggered by
events, such as slamming on one's brakes when a child darts in front
of one's car.1 82  Other precautions, however, are triggered by
memory. For instance, a driver must remember to keep a good
lookout even if no particular event reminds her of this necessity. As
was already noted, the actual compliance rate for memory-driven
precaution is especially likely to diverge from the required precau-
tion rate as the latter increases. The rate of compliance error is
predictably less for event-driven precaution than for its memory-
driven counterpart. Imagine an Indy driver weaving through the
field at high speed. Although the reasonable rate of precaution is
very high, the compliance rate will be practically perfect.
Events-such as another car cutting her off-remind the race driver
to apply the brakes. It seems likely that compliance rates are higher
when precaution is event-driven rather than memory-driven. When
a child darts out in front of a motorist, it is easy for the motorist to
remember to stop. Perhaps this is why there are more accidents on
straight roads than on curvy ones,183 and it may help explain why
179 120 N.E. 396 (Mass. 1918).
180 See id. at 397.
181 See id. ("[The] color and shape [of the tack] were such that it would naturally
escape the most careful scrutiny.").
182 Events that prompt precaution are a substitute for memory.
I' The act of driving on a curvy road reminds the driver to exercise caution. On
a straight road, however, the driver must remember to be careful-nothing about the
event itself will prompt her care.
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so many accidents occur close to the driver's home. 4 Close to
home, precaution becomes memory-driven.
8 5
Given the fallibility of memory-driven precautions, people search
for substitute methods, such as routine or habit. This substitute,
however, is itself fallible, and may make it more costly for people to
use event-driven precaution. For instance, an airplane pilot who is
relying on habit may be less flexible in using event-driven precau-
tion should an unusual occurrence arise. She may become, in
effect, the prisoner of routine. Another substitute for frequent
memory-driven precaution is a durable precaution that makes
failure less costly: for instance, a car with an air bag. Although this
method increases the driver's safety when she fails to keep a proper
lookout, it may at the same time reduce the safety of everyone else.
A third method is mechanical or electronic monitoring. A busy law
office installs an automated calendar to ensure that filings are made
on time for the same reason that an airline installs an alarm that
tells the pilot he is about to fly into a mountain. If the substitutes
for memory-driven precaution were always effective, there would be
few accidents. Here again, however, we have the problem of who
is watching the watchers.
E. Chronic vs. Acute Danger
Rapidly accelerating danger rates-acute dangers-imply high
rates of unavoidable accident and weak res ipsa cases. The reason
for this implication is that precaution is cheaper when it can be
planned over a longer period of time. The cases bear out the
prediction that acute danger situations will not succeed on a res ipsa
theory. In Larson v. St. Francis Hotel,186 the plaintiff was walking
on the street when she was struck by an armchair that someone had
thrown out of a hotel window. 87  She was nonsuited 18 8  In
Connolly v. Nicollet Hotel,' 9 the plaintiff was struck by a mud-like
substance while she was passing the defendant's hotel. 9 ° Here,
18 In a foreign setting, the driver is consciously aware of her surroundings and
is more likely to exercise the proper precaution rate. However, as the streets become
more familiar, the driver does not actively pay attention, and does not exercise due
care.
" A different reason for a higher rate of accidents that occur close to home is
that people drive close to home more often than elsewhere.
1 188 P.2d 513 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1948).
'm See id. at 514.
1 See id. at 516
189 95 N.W.2d 657 (Minn. 1959).
190 See id. at 661.
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however, the plaintiff was allowed to recover under the doc-
trine. 9' In both cases, the objects were thrown by celebrating
guests; thus, the hotels' negligence would consist in the failure to
exercise more restraint. In the St. Francis case, the cost of this
precaution would have been great, due to the fact that the guests
were celebrating the end of World War H and their celebration
developed rapidly over a few hours.'92 In the Nicollet case, howev-
er, the rate of unavoidable accident was less because the celebration,
ajunior Chamber of Commerce convention, accelerated less rapidly
over several days.
193
Some risks develop over extraordinarily long periods of time.
In Mullen v. St.John,"' the court held that the plaintiff did not
need evidence of specific negligence when a whole building fell on
him as he was passing by.9 5 When the period of time is long--
buildings deteriorate over long periods of time-and when the
evidence of deterioration is obvious, the conclusion of a compliance
error is practically ineluctable.
9 6
1 See id. at 669.
See St. Francis Hotel, 188 P.2d at 514. For the hotel to have prevented the
accident it would have had to monitor its guests 365 days each year-a costly prospect,
indeed. A case analogous to St. Francis Hotel is Hutchinson v. Boston Gas Light Co.,
122 Mass. 219, 219-22 (1877), in which the plaintiff was injured when she jumped
from a burning building in Boston. The fire in the building was caused by a gas
explosion, which allegedly resulted from the defendant gas company's negligence.
Notably, however, the explosion occurred in the immediate aftermath of the great fire
of November 9, 1872 that left a large portion of Boston in ruins. The streets were
full of rubbish from falling walls, and some areas of the city were under military
guard. On the morning of November 10th, there was a large gas explosion near the
building from which the plaintiff ultimately jumped, and it was this explosion that
started the fire in that building. Upon this evidence, the trial court directed a verdict
for the defendant. On appeal, the plaintiff contended that the evidence of
defendant's negligence was sufficient to have taken the case to thejury. The court,
however, held that the trial court properly directed a verdict for the defendant. As
in St. Francis Hotel, the court was presented with another rapidly accelerating risk
against which precautions would have been expensive. The rate of unavoidable
accident was high, and the plaintiffs res ipsa case weak. When a gas main blows up
under ordinary circumstances, the rate of unavoidable accident is lower and the
plaintiffs res ipsa case is strong.
193 See Nicollet Hotel, 95 N.W.2d at 668. The hotel could have taken relatively
inexpensive precautions since it had time to react.
1- 57 N.Y. 567 (1874).
195 The court said:
Buildings properly constructed do not fall without adequate cause. If there
be no tempest prevailing or no external violence of any kind, the fair pre-
sumption is that the fall occurred through adequate causes, such as the
ruinous condition of the building, which could scarcely have escaped the
observation of the owner.
Id. at 569-70.19 See Kearneyv. London, Brighton & S. Coast Ry., 6 L.R.-QB. 759,761-62 (1871)
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Unusual situations can throw into question whether a durable
precaution that is normally effective has failed for some reasonable
cause-for instance, its reasonable design limits have been exceeded.
Thus, if an earthquake had been in progress at the time the Byrne
v. Boadle accident took place, it would have prevented the case from
getting to a jury. Under these unusual conditions, the proportion
of unavoidable accident to compliance error increases. Mullen also
would have been a weak case if the collapse occurred two days after
an earthquake.
F. Unusually High Compliance Costs
Someone could be so tired that it would be negligent for that
person to drive. Nonetheless, if someone were only moderately
tired, this could increase the strength of a res ipsa case, because
fatigue increases the probability of compliance error. In Druzanich
v. Criley.97 the plaintiff, who was a sleeping passenger in the
automobile that the defendant was driving, prevailed under a res
ipsa theory because the defendant was sleepy.198 Her lack of
sleep, though not a breach of duty in itself, nonetheless increased
her compliance costs and made it more likely that she committed a
compliance error.
In Heans v. Mitchell'9 9 the defendant's and plaintiff's cars
collided as they were going in opposite directions on a two lane
highway. No one was injured, but the plaintiff's car was damaged.
The circumstances surrounding the accident were unclear, and the
plaintiff brought suit on a res ipsa theory. The defendant and his
wife had just been married and were on their way to their honey-
moon in St. Stephen."' In holding for the plaintiff, the trial
judge stated: "I am forced to believe that [the defendant's] mind
was so abstracted by the conditions at the time that he failed to see
the approaching car until too late."20 1  If the defendant was
(holding that plaintiff hit by falling brick when walking under defendant's bridge may
recover, especially in light of fact that other bricks had fallen before).
197 122 P.2d 53 (Cal. 1942).
19s See id. at 56.
199 [1936] 2 D.L.R. 260 (Can.).
200 See id. at 260-61.
2
1
1 Id. at 263. In reversing the judgment for the plaintiff, the New Brunswick
Supreme Court came to the opposite factual conclusion: "[T]he fact of marriage
instead of rendering the defendant careless might rather have made him more
cautious than usual for the sole and direct purpose of protecting the wife he had so
recently acquired, particularly when he was proceeding with her on their honey-
moon .... " Id. at 263-64.
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anticipating some joyous event or had just experienced some
grievous loss that may have momentarily taken his mind from his
duties, the case for res ipsa loquitur becomes stronger.0 2
Nevertheless, the courts behave as if they have a restrictive
definition of compliance costs, a point illustrated by Moore v.
Presnell.20°  In that case the plaintiffs were injured when the
defendant's deceased unexpectedly came across the center line and
crashed into the car in which they were riding. The defendant's
deceased died in the accident and was therefore unable to testify
about what had caused her to cross over into the opposing traffic.
Nevertheless, the defendant offered evidence that strongly suggest-
ed that the deceased had unexpectedly lost consciousness.
Following drivers testified that her head flopped to one side just
before she crossed the line. Also she was suffering from hyperten-
sion, which increases the probability of sudden blackouts. There
was evidence that she took no evasive action right up to the time of
the crash, and that she did not apply the brakes. A police investiga-
tion revealed no mechanical problem with her car that would have
caused it to crash. The court upheld a jury verdict for the defen-
dant on the ground that the evidence was sufficient to find that the
deceased unforeseeably blacked out.2 14 The case illustrates that
judicial measurement costs are lower for blackouts than for
forgotten precautions. If the deceased had merely forgotten to stay
on her side of the road, there would have been no evidence that
would have allowed the court to indicate that she may have been
using an efficient level of precaution. Hence, the rule would have
been strict liability. In the case of blackout, however, the court was
able to judge that the defendant was acting reasonably. She had no
prior history of blackouts or fainting spells, and she was taking a
prescription drug for her hypertension. The case also illustrates the
peculiar nature of the negligence rule. If the police had found a
steering problem with her car, or if there was evidence that she was
driving when she was tired, the plaintiff would have won. An
unexpected blackout is not a compliance error; a forgotten
precaution is.
2 In Hardman v. Younkers, 131 P.2d 177, 179 (Wash. 1942), the doctrine was
available to plaintiff in an otherwise poorly explained accident because it took place
while the defendant driver was filling his pipe. Although it was not negligent to fill
his pipe, it rendered compliance with the required precaution rate more costly.
Hence, with a higher cost of compliance, a rational maximizer would have a higher
rate of compliance error. The higher "efficient" error rate for the defendant made
the plaintiffs res ipsa case stronger.
0 379 A.2d 1246 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1977).
2o See id. at 1250.
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VIII. WHOSE COMPLIANCE ERROR?
A. Different Problems
Sometimes an accident will speak of compliance error, but it is
unclear by whom. The applicability of res ipsa in these cases is
weaker than in the ones that clearly speak of the defendant's
compliance error. The cases can be divided into two categories.
The first category consists of alternative causation cases in which it
appears that the accident resulted from either the defendant's
compliance error or someone else's, but not both. The second
category consists of concurrent causation cases in which it appears
that both the defendant's negligence and someone else's were joint
causes, but that someone else's negligence "cut off" the defendant's.
Both types of cases can raise problems with respect to two different
traditional res ipsa elements: "exclusive control" and "no contribu-
tion by the plaintiff." Hence, the analysis below differs somewhat
from the traditional type of res ipsa inquiry.
B. Alternative Causation
In many res ipsa cases, the accident's signature is consistent with
a compliance error by either one of two separate parties, but
probably not by both at the same time. For instance, in Harrison v.
Sutter Street Railway Co.2"' the plaintiffs decedent was a passenger
aboard one defendant's streetcar, which collided with the other
defendant's brewery wagon. The California court held that the trial
court did not err when it refused to instruct the jury on the
doctrine of res ipsa and ultimately nonsuited the plaintiff."6 A
compliance error by each defendant was equally likely.207 Non-
suiting plaintiffs when it is unclear which defendant was causally
negligent reduces the strict liability component of the negligence
rule. Ybarra v. Spangard208 is similar, but probably distinguishable.
In Ybarra, the defendants had a continuing relationship that
discouraged them from defecting from the "conspiracy of silence"
that the Ybarra court stressed. In Sutter, the parties had more
reason to defect-and finger the one who was guilty-in the absence
of a rule that would hold them jointly liable.
- 66 P. 787 (Cal. 1901).
2 See id. at 787-88.
0 The court apparently found it unlikely that both parties were causally negligent,
as might have been the case if one party had been negligent and the other party had
failed to get out of the way. See id. at 788.
208 154 P.2d 687 (Cal. 1944).
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In Schroerlucke v. McDaniel Funeral Home, Inc."9 the plaintiff,
who used a wheelchair, attended a funeral arranged by the defen-
dant. The plaintiff's son requested the defendant to transport the
plaintiff's wheelchair from her back porch to the church, which the
defendant did. The son told the defendant's employee how to
collapse the wheelchair and stressed the importance of inspecting
it once it was set up. Maybe for this reason the defendant chose not
to collapse the wheelchair but rather to carry it in the back of a
flower truck in its upright position. When the plaintiff sat on the
wheelchair at the funeral, it collapsed after she had been pushed
about three feet.21 The court held that she could not recover on
a res ipsa theory because the chair had not been in the exclusive
control of the defendant.21' The outcome of this case contrasts
with the more famous Benedict v. Eppley Hotel Co.212 in which the
plaintiff was injured while she was attending a bingo party at the
defendant's hotel. One of the hotel employees gave her a chair,
which she took to the bingo table and on which she sat uneventfully
for about a half hour. The chair suddenly collapsed, and an
inspection revealed that the bolts on one side were missing.
213
The plaintiff was able to recover on a res ipsa theory, even though
she herself had the most direct control of the chair at the time of
the accident.
214
Although the courts analyze the issue in terms of who had
exclusive control of the instrument, the issue at which they seem to
be aiming is whose compliance error was more likely, the defen-
dant's or the plaintiff's. In the funeral home case, it is unlikely that
the defendant committed a compliance error. It is more likely that
the wheelchair was defective due to some compliance error by the
plaintiff herself, or maybe by her son,215 or even by the manufac-
209 291 S.W.2d 6 (Ky. Ct. App. 1956).
210 See id. at 7.
211 See id. at 8-9.
212 65 N.W.2d 224 (Neb. 1954).
213 See id. at 226-27.
21
1 See id. at 229. As the court remarked:
Here it was the condition of the stool, not the use made of it, that was
responsible for the fall. Plaintiff had done no more than sit upon it when
it gave way, and there is no suggestion that [her] conduct was in any way
improper. So far as construction, inspection, or maintenance of the stool
were concerned, defendant had exclusive control. Plaintiff's actions had no
more legal significance as a cause of the accident than those of the innocent
bystander in the typical res ipsa loquitur case.
Id.
215 See Schroerlucke, 291 S.W.2d at 8.
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turer. On the other hand, in the bingo case, it seems much more
likely from the accident's signature that the compliance error was
committed by the hotel, especially since the bolts were missing.
Given the limited dealings that the plaintiff had with the chair, how
was it even possible for her to commit a compliance error?
216
C. Joint Causation
When the plaintiff proves specific negligence on the defendant's
part there is still the possibility that a supervening cause-negligence
by someone else-will cut off recovery from the defendant. In a res
ipsa case, the probability can be greater or less that between the
defendant's negligence-whatever it was-and the plaintiffs harm,
there was a wrongful act by someone else that would cut off the
defendant's liability.
In Kendall v. City of Boston,217 in order to entertain the Grand
Duke Alexis upon his visit to the United States, the city of Boston
rented the Boston Music Hall for a special concert in his honor.
The city authorities appointed a committee to decorate the Hall,
and this committee placed various ornaments on the wall, including
a bust of Benjamin Franklin, which was placed on or near the
balcony. The plaintiff received a ticket to the concert and sat in the
seat assigned to her, immediately under the bust of Franklin. At the
beginning of the concert, the program directed the audience to rise
to sing an anthem, but when the audience did so, the bust of
Franklin fell on the plaintiffs shoulder, injuring her.218  The
plaintiff alleged that
[she] was present in said building upon the invitation and with the
permission of the defendants, and while she was rightfully therein,
and was in the exercise of due care, said statue or bust fell upon
216 In Rose v. Melody Lane, 247 P.2d 335 (Cal. 1952), the plaintiff was injured
when a swivel bar stool on which he was sitting collapsed. After the accident, the
investigation determined that the pin had broken. Although the defendant's expert
testified that the fissure in the pin could not be detected without a microscope, the
defendant's assistant manager testified that he inspected the seats almost every day.
See id. at 337. Thejury returned a verdict for the plaintiff, and the question for the
California Supreme Court was whether the evidence was sufficient to support it. In
holding for the plaintiff, the court stressed that thejury was entitled to disbelieve the
defendant's expert. It also suggested that chairs of this type had a high required
inspection rate, and that thejury was entitled to infer that the critical inspection had
been missed. See id. at 337-38.
21 118 Mass. 234 (1875).
218 See id. at 234-35.
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her in consequence of the negligence and carelessness of the
defendants, and she was thereby greatly injured.
219
The defendants answered with a general denial."' At trial, the
plaintiff did not offer any evidence about whether the audience or
others had rightful access to the place where the bust was put.2 '
The Massachusetts court held that the trial court had properly
nonsuited the plaintiff because the plaintiff had presented insuffi-
cient evidence to warrant sending the case to the jury.222 Appar-
ently the court was influenced by the possibility that a member of
the audience could have knocked the bust down.22 3 The assump-
tion seems to have been that this negligence, or even intentional
wrongdoing, by the unknown audience member would have been a
supervening cause that cut off the defendant's liability.
224
By contrast in White v. Boston & Albany Railroad Co.,2 25 a case
decided only twelve years later, the plaintiff, a minor about four
years of age, was on the defendant's train. The woman who
accompanied and had charge of the plaintiff testified that they took
the train leaving Boston in the afternoon of April 9, 1885; that the
lamps in the cars were not lighted; that before reaching the first
station out of Boston, she heard a crash over her head, and, an
instant afterward, several pieces of the porcelain shade fell from the
upper part of the car into her lap; and that one struck the plaintiff
on the face, inflicting injuries. Another witness testified that she
saw a piece of the shade fall and saw it strike the child; and that it
219 Id. at 234.
220 See id.
22 See id. at 236.
"2 A similar case is Greenberg v. Steeplechase Amusement Co., 291 N.Y.S. 512
(App. Div. 1936), where it was held that the trial court improperly dismissed the
complaint when it appeared that the plaintiff's steeplechase horse ran off the track.
The court noted that
[w]hile riding a mechanical horse, the horse came in contact with an iron
pipe placed on the rail on which the horse traveled and the horse collapsed
and plaintiff was injured. The case was tried on the theory that the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur applied. Defendant offered proof that the pipe was
inserted through a picket fence by boys who were on the street abutting the
raceway.
Id. at 513.
22 See Kendall, 118 Mass. at 236.
224 This case would probably not be decided the same way today because courts
have expanded duties to anticipate use precaution against foreseeable negligence. See
e.g., Weirum v. RKO Gen., Inc., 539 P.2d 36, 40 (Cal. 1975) (holding radio station
liable for the death of passenger who was hit by teenage driver participating in a
radio contest sponsored by the defendant because it was foreseeable that the
participant would disregard the rules of the road in an attempt to win the game).
s 11 N.E. 552 (Mass. 1887).
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came from the porcelain shade of an overhead lamp which was a
fixture in the car. 2 6 On appeal, the defendant contended that the
evidence of its negligence had been insufficient to warrant sending
the case to the jury. The Massachusetts court, holding for the
plaintiff, found that the evidence was sufficient to support the
verdict.2 27  The differing outcomes seem logical as there was a
much smaller probability of a supervening cause in the White case
than in Kendall.
In some cases a compliance error by the plaintiff is probable, for
instance, where the defendant's precautions, when taken, still leave
a substantial chance of accident for the plaintiffs precautions to
counter. In Phillips v. Klepfer,221 the plaintiffs heel got caught in
a sidewalk upon which the defendant had nailed strips of wood to
help people keep their footing. The trial court, in a bench trial,
awarded judgment to the plaintiff, but the Indiana Supreme Court
reversed, finding that the evidence of res ipsa was insufficient to
support the verdict.
229
Some accident signatures rule out the possibility of compliance
error by the plaintiff. For instance, in Zappala v. Stanley Co.,
280
when the plaintiff was ushered through a darkened theater and
shown to a seat, there was no opportunity for compliance error on
his part when the seat collapsed beneath him. This was a clear case
of res ipsa loquitur against the defendant, because there was no
possibility of a compliance error by the plaintiff.
2 1
CONCLUSION
The preceding positive economic analysis indicates that there is
a counterintuitive idea at the very center of res ipsa doctrine. The
more advanced the safety technology present in the relevant activity,
the more loudly an accident speaks of negligence. The orthodox
economic theory of tort, with its emphasis on the Learned Hand
226 See id. at 552-53.
22 See id. at 554.
22 27 N.E.2d 340 (Ind. 1940).
222 See id. at 341-42. Very early res ipsa cases denied the plaintiff the benefit of
the doctrine when a compliance error by him could have jointly caused the harm. See
Siner v. Great Western Ry., 4 L.R.-Ex. 117 (1869) (plaintiff injured while getting off
train that stopped at wrong part of the platform); Cornman v. Eastern Counties Ry.,
157 Eng. Rep. 1050 (Ex. 1859) (plaintiff tripped on scales); Toomey v. London,
Brighton & S. Coast Ry., 140 Eng. Rep. 694 (C.P. 1857) (plaintiff mistook lamp room
for men's room).
0 12 A.2d 691 (N.J. 1940) (reversing nonsuit entered against plaintiff).
21 Res ipsa was also available to the plaintiff in Sasso v. Randforce Amusement
Corp., 275 N.Y.S. 891 (1934), whose theater seat collapsed beneath him.
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formula and durable precaution, might suggest exactly the opposite
conclusion. Under the conventional analysis, it might seem that the
safer the technology is, the less likely is a judicial finding of
negligence. Nonetheless, the counterintuitive idea of the actual
doctrine makes more sense once we account for the importance of
the pocket of strict liability within the negligence rule. Elaborate
durable precaution increases the likelihood that a given accident will
fall within the pocket, a point that legal economists have, up to this
point, neglected to notice.

